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The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for
Patent Misuse
ROBIN C. FELDMAN*
Patent misuse lies at the intersection of patent and antitrust law. The
history and conceptual overlap of patent law and antitrust law have left
the doctrine of misuse hopelessly entangled with antitrust doctrines. In
response, a number of scholars and legislators have argued for streamlin-
ing the patent misuse inquiry by applying antitrust rules.' Current court
decisions have moved in this direction as well.'
The notion of applying antitrust rules to test for patent misuse has
an appealing logic. Patent misuse can be defined as an improper attempt
to expand a patent. Antitrust principles, among other things, restrict the
improper expansion of monopolies. Shouldn't courts be able to use anti-
trust rules to identify an improper expansion of a patent monopoly?
* Assistant Professor, U.C. Hastings College of the Law. I wish to thank Margreth Barrett,
John Barton, Ash Bhagwat, Dan Burk, June Carbone, David Earp, Susan Freiwald, Paul Goldstein,
Matthew Greene, Herbert Hovenkamp, Jeff Lefstin, Mark Lemley, Maura Rees, Ernest Young, and
participants in the 2003 Intellectual Property Scholars' Conference for their comments on prior drafts.
I am grateful beyond measure to Linda Weir, U.C. Hastings Public Services Librarian, for her research
and insights. I am also indebted to Amy Hsiao for research assistance on antitrust and to Gary Chang
and Daniel Wan for research assistance on Reach-Through Royalties.
. See, e.g., USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1982); Windsurfing
Int'l Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, Ioos (Fed. Cir. 1986); Mark A. Lemley, The Economic Irrational-
ity of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. I599 (i99o); Competition Policy and the Patent Mis-
use Doctrine, Remarks by Roger B. Andewelt, Chief Intellectual Property Section, Antitrust Division
Before the Bar Association for the District of Columbia Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Section,
Nov. 3, 1982, reprinted in 25 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 41 (1982); infra notes 1O-Oi
(concerning the debate surrounding the 1988 Patent Act Amendments); see also Note, Is the Patent
Misuse Doctrine Obsolete?, 11O HARV. L. REV. 1922, I939 (1997) (arguing that although the substantive
test for misuse should be subsumed under an antitrust analysis, the relaxed standing requirements of
misuse should be maintained); but see Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal,
97 HARv. L. REV. 1813, 1818-20 (1984) (arguing that neither patent nor antitrust law should reign su-
preme and suggesting that courts should determine whether a patentee's practice is acceptable by cal-
culating a ratio that compares (I) the patentee's marginal reward over the optimal patent reward to
(2) society's marginal monopoly loss in the case of that practice).
2. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. I998); B. Braun Med.
Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133
F.3d 86o, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 7o8 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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The approach is particularly appealing given that antitrust law is a
larger and more fully developed body of law than patent misuse.3 Apply-
ing antitrust rules could provide greater clarity in patent misuse doctrine
and eliminate a source of confusion at the intersection of patent and anti-
trust law.
Theoretical arguments in favor of applying antitrust rules to test for
patent misuse assume that antitrust rules can adequately identify the
types of harm that patent misuse is designed to address. This Article ar-
gues that the assumption is unfounded. Antitrust law is designed to ad-
dress only particular types of harm, and it cannot reach everything that
patent policy addresses. Thus, applying antitrust rules to test for patent
misuse would ignore significant concerns under patent policy.
The goal of patent law is to promote the progress of science for the
overall benefit of society. Patent rights are offered to induce inventions
whose creation and disclosure will benefit society. It is the overall benefit
to society, rather than the benefit to an individual inventor, that is para-
mount in the patent system.
Within this structure, limiting the time and scope of a patent limits
the potential economic harms that may flow from granting a patent. Such
potential harms include the type of monopoly effects that raise concerns
under antitrust law, but they are not confined to this effect. Potential
harms also include (I) other types of economic waste, such as the waste
that can occur with defensive research or inventing around a patent, (2)
the burden on innovation that can result from an overproliferation of
patent rights, and (3) the disincentives to innovation that can result from
allocating reward to early-stage inventors over late-stage inventors.
Thus, limiting an individual patent enhances the overall efficiency of
the patent system in its quest to promote the inventions that will eventu-
ally enter into the public domain. Altering the limits on time and scope
threatens to upset the balances struck in the system.
Antitrust law, however, would not necessarily be sensitive to these
policy dictates. In order to create the harm that antitrust law recognizes,
a firm ordinarily must have market power. Without market power, a firm
cannot raise prices, limit supplies, and create the type of anticompetitive
effects that antitrust law recognizes. Thus, where no market power exists,
antitrust is generally unconcerned by firm behavior. This is particularly
true for the rule of reason, which always requires a finding of market
power.
3. See, e.g., USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505,52 (7th Cir. 1982) (arguing that if pat-
ent misuse is not tested by conventional antitrust principles, our law is not rich in alternative concepts
of monopolistic abuse).
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A patent, however, does not necessarily result in market power. No
one may be interested in the patented invention or there may be suffi-
cient substitutes such that the patent holder does not have power in a
properly defined market. One who holds a patent on a process for mak-
ing margarine, for example, must still compete with those who use other
processes.
Using an antitrust test to decide whether a firm has engaged in be-
havior that impermissibly extends a patent will only stop extensions by
firms that have market power. Patent policy, however, does not limit its
concerns to firms with market power. The patent rules do not say, for ex-
ample, that we grant a patent for twenty years, but the twenty-year limit
only applies to patent holders who have market power.
Even if a patent holder does have market power, antitrust still may
be insufficient to capture the full range of patent policy concerns. Patent
policy is concerned with extensions of patent rights that hamper system-
wide innovation, even if those extensions do not create the type of effects
that the antitrust ear is tuned to hear. Antitrust, with its focus on price
effects in particular markets, may not be sensitive enough to respond to
behavior that threatens the overall efficiency of the patent system. In
short, if we use antitrust to test for patent misuse, we may be blind to sig-
nificant concerns under patent policy.
In addition to the theoretical discussion described above, this Article
uses the example of Reach-Through Royalties to highlight the problems
of testing for patent misuse by applying antitrust law. Reach-Through
Royalties are a licensing arrangement used in the biotech industry in
which the patent holder charges a royalty based on a percentage of the
sales of any product developed using the patented invention. For exam-
ple, suppose John gives Mary a license to use the cloning method he has
patented. With a Reach-Through Royalty, Mary agrees to pay a percent-
age of her sales revenue from any medicine, diagnostic test, or other
product she may eventually develop from what she discovers using the
cloning method.
Reach-Through Royalties raise potential patent misuse problems,
both in terms of extending the time and expanding the scope of the pat-
ent grant. Antitrust rules would not detect the full range of either the
time or scope problems raised.
During the development of the patent misuse doctrine in the early
i9oos, the Supreme Court considered and rejected applying antitrust law
to test for patent misuse.4 The Court concluded that patent misuse is
aimed at behavior that does not necessarily violate the antitrust laws and
4. See infra Part I.
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that patent misuse claims should be tested according to patent policy, not
antitrust rules.'
The Federal Circuit, however, has changed patent misuse by insert-
ing an antitrust test. Current Federal Circuit opinions note that patent
misuse is aimed at practices that do not necessarily violate the antitrust
laws but then proceed to test for patent misuse by applying antitrust
rules.6 In particular, as the general rule for testing patent misuse, current
cases require application of the antitrust Rule of Reason. The result is a
confusing tangle of doctrine that distorts both patent misuse and anti-
trust.
Part I of this Article describes the history of the doctrine of patent
misuse and explains the cross-currents the Supreme Court was navigating
when the doctrine first emerged. Part II analyzes current Federal Circuit
doctrine and describes how the doctrine veered off course. Part III de-
scribes the insufficiency of antitrust as a test for patent misuse. Part IV
discusses Reach-Through Royalties as an example of how applying anti-
trust analysis to test for patent misuse fails to capture significant patent
policy concerns.
I. HISTORY AND THEORY OF PATENT MISUSE
Patent misuse is generally defined as an impermissible attempt to ex-
tend the time or scope of the patent grant.' It is an affirmative defense to
patent infringement. If a patent holder has misused its patent, courts will
8
refuse to enforce the patent against any infringer. The patent holder will
be denied relief until the abusive practice has been abandoned and the
effects of the practice have dissipated.9
A finding of patent misuse will not result in monetary damages. The
remedy for patent misuse is to render the patent unenforceable.'"
5. See infra Part I.
6. Precedents that do not seem to fit within this rule are explained as instances of behaviors that
have been designated as per se misuse or per se not misuse. See infra note 137.
7. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of I11. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343-44 ('971) (ex-
plaining that patent monopolies should be free from fraud and inequitable conduct, a principle mani-
fested in a series of decisions in which the Court has condemned attempts to broaden the physical or
temporal scope of the patent monopoly); 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.04 (2OO1).
8. Upon a finding of misuse, a court will refuse to enforce the patent against any infringer, even
one who was not harmed by the abusive practice. See id.
9. See, e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that
a holding of misuse renders the patent unenforceable until the misuse is purged but does not invalidate
the patent).
io. See, e.g., B. Braun Med. Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3 d 1419, 1428 (Fed. Cir. j997) (monetary
damages not awarded under a declaratory judgment counterclaim based on patent misuse because
patent misuse simply renders the patent unenforceable).
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A. EARLY HISTORY
Early stirrings of the patent misuse doctrine can be traced to cases in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This period saw the
passage of state and federal antitrust laws outlawing unreasonable re-
straints of trade and other anticompetitive behavior."
During this time, patent defendants complained of schemes by pat-
ent holders to do precisely what the antitrust laws were designed to for-
bid: monopolize markets, fix prices, and create tying arrangements.'2 This
raised the specter that patent holders were using the patent laws as an
end-run around the antitrust laws.
Early case law did offer patent holders an opportunity to avoid anti-
trust law with impunity. Patent holders entered into agreements or im-
posed restrictions on the use of an invention that created market effects
forbidden under the antitrust laws. Patent holders then avoided antitrust
scrutiny by arguing that patent law provides an absolute shield, allowing
the imposition of any restriction or agreement related to the use of an in-
vention."
Claims that patent rights were being abused arose in three different
types of suits: affirmative claims for violation of the antitrust laws; defen-
sive claims to fend off an infringement suit; and defensive claims to fend
off a breach of contract suit involving a patent license. The underlying
doctrinal problem, however, remained the same for all three. Could a
body of case law granting monopolies be reconciled with a body of case
law curtailing monopolies, and if not, which one should be subservient to
the other?
Some early cases suggested resolving the tension by drawing a dis-
tinction between rights gained by patent and rights secured by private
contract. According to this view, rights arising under patent law would
not be subject to antitrust scrutiny but only to scrutiny under patent prin-
ciples. Rights gained by contract, however, could be subject to an inquiry
I I. Congress approved the Sherman Act in 1890 and the Clayton Act in 1914. See Note, Patent
Rights and the Antitrust Laws, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 542, 542 nn.1, 2 (917).
12. See, e.g., Strait v. Nat'l Harrow Co., 51 F. 819 (N.D.N.Y. 1892) (monopolizing markets); Be-
ment v. Nat'l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902) (price-fixing); Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. s (1912)
(tying); Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896) (ty-
ing).
13. For example, during Senate hearings, a German manufacturer commented that he had no
reason to get excited about American antitrust law if he wanted to control the distribution of markets.
He could accomplish the same goal through patent licensing. See F. MACHLUP, SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS., AN ECONOMIC
REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 15 at n.56 (Comm. Print 1958) (citing Hearings before the S. Comm. on
Patents on S. 2303 and S. 2491, pt. 3, P. 1318 (1942)).
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into the nature and character of the agreement, including whether the
agreement constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade. 4
Patent law itself appeared to offer few limitations on a patent
holder's behavior, particularly the types of behavior defendants were
complaining about. The first wave of cases decided during this period
concluded that patent rights were quite broad. A patent confers the right
to exclude others from making, using or selling the invention. As a corol-
lary to these rights, a patent holder may choose to completely withhold
the patented invention from the market." In early opinions, the courts
reasoned that if a patent holder had the right to withhold the invention,
this included the lesser right of dictating the terms on which others might
use the invention. 6 How could the law restrict any terms a patent holder
might impose if the patent holder could refuse to license on any terms?
Although patent law offered little relief, one might have expected
defendants to fare better against breach of contract claims. Early Su-
preme Court cases, however, seemed to close down the possibility of
14. See Henry v. AB. Dick, 224 U.S. at 29-30 (noting in dicta that the general rule in a patent
infringement suit is absolute freedom as to the terms imposed on users whereas in a suit to recover
damages upon a contract, one could conceivably defend on the grounds that the contract was against
public policies such as the antitrust laws), overruled on other grounds by Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg., 243 U.S. 502, 514-17 (1917); Strait v. Harrow, 51 F. 819, 820 (N.D.N.Y. 1892)
(noting that if a patentholder sued for breach of contract, it might be pertinent to inquire into the na-
ture of the agreement while in a suit for patent infringement, such an inquiry would be inappropriate).
The Strait v. Harrow court found further support for the distinction between patent and antitrust
law by an analogy to land law. See 51 F. at 820 (N.D.N.Y. 1892) (arguing that the law would not de-
cline to enforce trespass rights just because you were doing something illegal with your land); see also
16 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.04[I][a] (2003) (describing the Strait v. Harrow anal-
ogy to land law). But see Mortimer Feuer, The Patent Monopoly and the Anti-Trust Laws, 38 COLUM.
L. REV. 1145, 1174 (1938) (suggesting logical flaws in a similar analogy).
15. See Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed. 288, 294-95 (6th
Cir. 1896); see also Henry v. A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. at 28 (1912). As described below, the Supreme Court
later would reject the notion that the right to completely withhold an invention from the market in-
cludes the lesser right of permitting others to use the invention on whatever terms the patent holder
wishes. See text accompanying notes 23-27, infra; Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 514-17. The rule
that a patent holder may completely withhold an invention from the market continued, however, and
was eventually codified in the 1988 Amendments to the Patent Act. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)( 4 ) (2000)
(stating that "[nlo patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringe-
ment of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent
right by reason of his having.., refused to license or use any rights to the patent"). The interplay be-
tween a patent holder's right to withhold an invention and antitrust law's potential liability for "refus-
als to deal" continues to confound modern courts. See generally Peter M. Boyle et al., Antitrust Law at
the Federal Circuit: Red Light or Green Light at the IP-Antitrust Intersection?, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 739
(comparing In re Independent Serv. Organizations Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2ooo), cert.
denied sub nom. CSU L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 531 U.S. 1143 (2001), with Image Technical Services Inc.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d at 1195 (9th Cir. 1997)).
6. See Henry v. A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. at 35 (noting that the larger right embraces the lesser of
permitting others to use upon such terms as the patentee chooses to prescribe); Heaton-Peninsular
Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896) (same).
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raising antitrust defenses in cases sounding in contract as well as those
sounding in patent. This viewpoint appeared in dicta in Henry v. A.B.
Dick, a case involving tying behavior by a patent holder. 7 The logic of
Henry v. A.B. Dick also suggested that affirmative claims for violation of
the antitrust laws against patent holders also would fail. 8
The issue reached a climax for the Supreme Court in the Motion Pic-
ture Patents case, in which the patent holder brought an infringement suit
17. In Henry v. A.B. Dick, the Supreme Court rejected an antitrust defense to a claim of patent
infringement. In dicta, the Court noted that if the suit had been one to recover damages for breach of
contract, rather than for patent infringement, defendants could have raised public policy defenses such
as antitrust. 224 U.S. at 29-3 o . The Court, however, then cited an earlier Supreme Court opinion that
had rejected an antitrust defense to a claim for breach of contract by arguing that Congress could not
have intended the Sherman Act to apply to patents at all. Id. (citing Bement v. Nat'l Harrow Co., 186
U.S. 70, 92 (1902)); see also Tying Clause Contract Limiting Use of Patented Article Invalidated-The
Mimeograph Case (Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. i) Overruled, Vol. 84 No. I8 CENT. L.J. 335,335-
36 (1917). Thus, the Henry v. A.B. Dick opinion suggested that antitrust would fail as a defense against
a claim for breach of contract, as well as against a claim for patent infringement.
The Bement Court had argued the following:
It is true that it has been held by this court that the act included any restraint of commerce,
whether reasonable or unreasonable. But that statute clearly does not refer to that kind of a
restraint of interstate commerce which may arise from reasonable and legal conditions im-
posed upon the assignee or licensee of a patent by the owner thereof, restricting the terms
upon which the article may be used and the price to be demanded therefor.
186 U.S. at 92 (citations omitted).
The Bement case makes most sense when considered in its historic context. The Sherman Act
prohibits every contract in restraint of trade. Taken literally, the language could prohibit almost any
business agreement. See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (j978).
Given the extensive reach of the language, the Supreme Court eventually interpreted the Sherman
Act to forbid only those agreements that "unreasonably" restrain trade. See Feuer, supra note 14, at
1572.
The foundations of this test were laid in the case of Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United
States, 22i U.S. 1, 62 (19ri). See Continental T.V., Inc. v. Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,49 (1977) (describ-
ing the traditional judicial gloss on the statutory language). The Bement case, however, was decided
prior to Standard Oil and at a time when the Court was still struggling to define the reach of the anti-
trust laws. The Court may have been willing to move contracts relating to patents out of the path of
the antitrust laws when the antitrust laws seemed so insatiable.
I8. See supra note 17. Congress responded to some of the implications of the Henry v. A.B. Dick
case in the passage of an amendment to the antitrust laws known as the Clayton Act. The Clayton Act
provides, among other things, that tying can form the basis of an antitrust violation. See 15 U.S.C. § 14
(2ooo); see also Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg., 243 U.S. 502, 517 (1917). Tying
occurs when a firm agrees to sell a product only on condition that the buyer purchases a different
product as well or agrees not to purchase a second product from another supplier. See N. Pac. Ry. Co.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958); see also H.R. Rep. No. 63-627, Pt. i, at 13 (954) (describing
tying). The Clayton Act specifically refers to agreements relating to goods "whether patented or un-
patented." See 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2ooo). With this language, Congress expressed its intent that contracts
involving the exercise of patent rights should be subject to an affirmative claim for violation of the an-
titrust laws, at least in the case of tying. The Clayton Act language, however, did not answer the ques-
tion of whether such contracts should be subject to other antitrust claims or whether infringement
defendants could assert the Clayton Act, or any other state or federal antitrust provisions, as a de-
fense.
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to enforce restrictions that were squarely in violation of federal antitrust
laws.'9 The case arrived on the Supreme Court's doorstep amid rising
concerns about increasingly oppressive use of patents." In theory, three
avenues might have been available to curb patent holder behavior: af-
firmative claims under the antitrust laws; defensive claims in infringe-
ment suits; and defensive claims in breach of contract suits. All three
avenues, however, had been called into doubt.
The case concerned post-sale restrictions on a film projector. In par-
ticular, the film projector could be used only with film made by the pat-
ent holder. Subsequent purchasers of the machine were notified of the
restriction by a plaque mounted on the machine.2
The Appellate Court found that the patent holder's behavior consti-
tuted tying and violated the Clayton Act." The Appellate Court used this
antitrust finding to bolster its conclusion that the restriction should not
be enforced through a patent infringement claim.
The Supreme Court, however, refused to rely on a violation of the
antitrust laws, suggesting instead that the proper focus of the analysis
should be patent law.23 Analyzing the problem from the perspective of
patent law, the Court reasoned that a patent holder's rights are bounded
by the invention itself. 4 Thus, attempts to control products not described
in the invention are outside the scope of what is granted by patent law,
I9. See generally Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 502. When the Motion Picture Patents opin-
ion was issued, commentators struggled, with only limited success, to make sense of the opinion and its
broader implications. For immediate reaction to Motion Picture Patents, see Note, The Right of the
Patentee to Control the Use or Price of a Patented Article upon Resale, 4 IOWA L. BULL. 40 (i918); Pat-
ents-Restriction on Use-Future Conditions-Notice, 2 MINN. L. REV. 66 (1917-I8); Comment, Re-
straint of Trade: Common Law: Patents, 5 CAL. L. REV. 425 (1916-17); Note, Patent Rights and the
Anti-Trust Laws, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 542 (917); Right of a Patentee to Restrict the Price and the Use of
a Patented Article, 31 HARV. L. REV. 298 (1917-18); Tying Clause Contract Limiting Use of Patented
Article Invalidated- The Mimeograph Case (Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. i) Overruled, Vol. 84
No. I8 CENT. L.J. 335 (917).
20. For example, the Supreme Court in the Motion Picture Patents case noted that patent holders
had reacted to earlier cases by adopting restrictions that "expanded into more and more comprehen-
sive forms .... The perfect instrument of favoritism and oppression which such a system of doing
business, if valid, would put into the control of the owner of such a patent should make courts astute, if
need be, to defeat its operation." See Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 515; see also Note, Contribu-
tory Infringement and Misuse- The Effect of Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 66 HARV. L. REV.
909, 911 (953) (noting that change in the personnel of the Supreme Court and growing awareness of
the monopolistic abuses of tying clauses led to a sweeping limitation in Motion Picture Patents).
21. Patents on the film had expired, raising the specter that the arrangement was intended to ex-
tend the life of the expired film patents. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg., 235 F.
398, 400 (2d Cir. 1916).
22. See Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 51; see also supra note 19 (describing the passage of
the Clayton Act).
23. See Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 509, 514.
24. Id.
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and the Court refused to enforce such attempts through a claim of in-
fringement.25 This logic repudiated the earlier notion that a patent
holder's right to completely withhold an invention from the market em-
braced the lesser right of restricting the use by almost any terms. 26 Not all
terms would be acceptable. Terms extending beyond the patented inven-
tion do not pertain to rights granted by the patent laws and could not be
enforced through a patent infringement claim.
Although declining the invitation to rely on a violation of the Clay-
ton Act, the Supreme Court used the Clayton Act to support its conclu-
sions about the potential evils of tying:
We are confirmed in the conclusion which we are announcing by the
fact that... [Congress] has enacted a law making it unlawful for any
person engaged in interstate commerce "to lease or make a sale or con-
tract for sale of goods.., whether patented or unpatented... on the
condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or purchaser
thereof shall not use ... the goods... machinery, supplies or other
commodities of a competitor... where the effect of such lease, sale, or
contract for sale... may be to substantially lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."
Our conclusion renders it unnecessary to make the application of this
statute to the case at bar which the Circuit Court of Appeals made of
it, but it must be accepted by us as a most persuasive expression of the
public policy of our country with respect to the question before us. "
In short, the Court suggested that an analysis of tying in antitrust cir-
cumstances would give further insight into tying in the context of patent
policy. Just as tying is bad in an antitrust context because it improperly
extends a monopoly, so tying is bad in a patent context because it ex-
tends the scope of a patent. The logic of the ruling, however, would rest
on patent principles.
Thus, original doctrinal trends had barred all avenues through which
a defendant might have complained about improper patent holder be-
havior. In Motion Picture Patents, the Supreme Court opened one ave-
nue by holding that in an infringement suit, a defendant could raise
issues related to improper patent holder behavior, issues that would be
25. See id. at 508 (infringement cause of action); id. at 519 (rejecting the suit).
26. See id. at 514-17. For an interesting discussion of how changes in the Court's composition may
have contributed to shifts in the relevant legal doctrines, see Comment, Restraint of Trade: Common
Law; Patents, 5 CAL. L. REV. 425, 426-27 (1916-17).
27. Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 517-18.
28. See, e.g., id. at 514, 517-18 (analyzing this infringement claim solely from the perspective of
patent law and emphasizing that antitrust law would not be applied). For a good list of articles from
the late 193OS and early 194os exploring the notion that use of a tying clause is outside the scope of the
patent monopoly, see Patents-Extent of Use of Patent-Use of Tying Agreement Bars Patentee in In-
fringement Suit, 9U. CHL L. REV. 518,521 n.15 (1941-42).
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evaluated under patent law and patent policy. The Court left for another
day the question of whether in a breach of contract suit, rather than in an
infringement suit, a defendant could raise issues related to inappropriate
patent holder behavior or whether such defenses would be barred by the
existence of patent rights in the contract. 9 Earlier doctrinal trends had
suggested that such a defense was barred by the existence of patent rights
in the contract, and thus ordinary antitrust defenses would not apply."
The Supreme Court would eventually hold that in a breach of con-
tract suit, defendants could raise issues related to inappropriate patent
holder behavior, despite the existence of patent rights in the contract.
The Court would also find that improper patent holder behavior could
form the basis of an affirmative claim for violation of the antitrust laws.3
In both circumstances, the Court would focus on the notion that attempts
to expand the time and scope of the patent constituted behavior outside
the grant of the patent and beyond the protection of patent law.33
As a result, behavior that formed the basis of a patent misuse de-
fense could also form the basis of a defense that a contract was void or
the basis of an affirmative claim for violation of the antitrust laws.' In all
three settings, patent holders were considered to be acting outside the
scope of the patent and therefore could not rely on the protections of the
patent law.
29. Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 5o9. "The extent to which the use of the patented machine
may validly be restricted to specific supplies or otherwise by special contract between the owner of a
patent and a purchaser or licensee is a question outside the patent law and with it we are not here con-
cerned." Id.
30. See supra text accompanying notes 13-18.
31. See Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173 (holding in a breach of contract
suit that defendant could raise a defense of illegal price-fixing under the Sherman Act).
32. See Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 34 n.4 0930 (noting that in some
cases, the attempt to use the patent unreasonably to restrain commerce is not only beyond the scope of
the patent but also a direct violation of the Anti-Trust Acts).
33. For a general description of this notion in a related context, see Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus
Mfg., 326 U.S. 249, 256-57 (1945); see also supra notes 29-30; B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124
F.3d 1419, 1428 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that precedent has explained that the same actions by a
patentee that result in patent misuse may also serve as an element of an affirmative claim for damages.
Therefore, a party in defendant's position might be entitled to damages under an antitrust or breach of
contract theory); Senza-Gel v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 66i, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting that patent misuse
may serve, as here, as a defense to a charge of patent infringement but also as an element in a com-
plaint charging antitrust violation); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 67o-71
(1944) (finding of misuse does not dispose of the counterclaim for damages which is more than a de-
fense but a separate statutory cause of action); Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27,
34 n.4 0930 (noting that in some cases, the "attempt to use the patent unreasonably to restrain com-
merce is not only beyond the scope of the [patent] but also a direct violation of the Anti-Trust Acts").
34. Courts and litigants do not always use clear language differentiating between finding patent
misuse as a defense to infringement and analyzing similar behavior as a defense to damages for breach
of contract. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. ioo (1969) (holding no
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Thus, although it would take the Court some time to fill in the de-
tails, Motion Picture Patents formed the framework of an analysis the
Court would use to try to reconcile patent and antitrust.35 Across a range
of issues, the Court would focus on the concept of actions inside and out-
side the patent grant as a way to define the relationship between patent
and antitrust. Navigating this intersection, however, has occupied legions
of courts and scholars for generations.36
More specifically, however, the decision in Motion Picture Patents
established what would become known as the doctrine of patent misuse.37
The Court further developed the doctrine in a series of cases, Carbice,as
Leitch,39 Morton Salt,4' and Mercoid,4" against a backdrop of continued
national concern about the use of patents.42 In particular, in Morton Salt
the Court amplified its earlier decision by holding explicitly that patent
misuse does not require a violation of the antitrust laws.
patent misuse in a breach of contract case). The implications of the two, however, can be quite differ-
ent. See i HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ArrrRusr § 3.3b3 at 3-24 (2002 & Supp. 2003) (noting
that although the Brulotte case is read as a classic example of misuse, the court merely refused to en-
force collection of some of the royalties, rather than refusing to enforce any rights until the misuse
effects had dissipated); cf. Senza-Gel, 803 F.2d at 668 (complaining that the parties had failed to ade-
quately differentiate between patent misuse behavior in the context of an affirmative claim for anti-
trust violation and patent misuse behavior in the context of a defense).
35. For example, six years later, the Supreme Court would echo this approach in a Constitutional
challenge to the Clayton Act in what is known as the Second Shoe Machinery Case. In the Second Shoe
Machinery Case, the patent holder had argued that the Clayton Act constitutes a taking from patent
holders without due process of law. See United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 462
(1922). The Court upheld the Clayton Act by adhering to the notion that with tying agreements, pat-
ent holders act outside the bounds of the legitimate rights granted by the Patent Act. Id. at 464. Given
that Congress did not interfere with legitimate rights secured by the patent, Congress did not take any-
thing. Id. But see Feuer, supra note 14, at 1 16o (describing the Court's logic as resourcefully tugging at
its own bootstraps).
36. See Louis Kaplow, The Parent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813,
1815 (1984) (noting that "the intersection of antitrust law and patent policy has proved to be a source
of perpetual confusion and controversy since the passage of the Sherman Act nearly a century ago").
37. See i HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST § 3.2 at 3-3 (2002 & 2003 Supp.) (noting
that Motion Picture Patents case was the first application of the principle of patent misuse); Note, Con-
tributory Infringement and Misuse- The Effect of Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 909, 911 (1953) (noting that Court in Motion Picture Patents case relied on a rationale that would
subsequently form the basis of patent misuse); see also Mercoid Corp v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320
U.S. 661, 668 n.l (1944) (referring to the Motion Picture Patents case as evidence that the doctrine of
patent misuse was developed later than a 19o9 case).
38. See Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
39. See Leitch Mfg. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938).
40. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
41. See Mercoid, 320 U.S. at 661. Mercoid presented particularly difficult facts in that the patent
covered a combination, a sequence that is new but in which every element is old and unpatentable. See
id. at 6 78-79 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson, in a portion of the dissent in which he agreed
with the majority, described the patent in the following fashion: "[W]e have an abstract right in an ab-
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In Morton Salt, plaintiff and defendants both made machines for in-
jecting salt tablets. Plaintiff claimed that the defendant's machine in-
fringed its machine patent. The trial judge dismissed the suit with a one-
page order citing a patent misuse case 3 on the ground that the plaintiff
had illegally tied sales of salt tablets to sales of its machines.' The Sev-
enth Circuit reversed, arguing that the Trial Court should not have
granted summary judgment on misuse without evidence that the patent
holder's actions violated the Clayton Act.45
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the question for misuse is
not whether the patent holder violated the Clayton Act, but whether a
court of equity will lend its aid to protect a patent monopoly when the
patent is being used to secure rights beyond the scope of the patent and
therefore contrary to public policy. 6 An antitrust violation would not be
necessary in order to prove patent misuse nor would antitrust analysis
provide the proper test.
In addition, by invoking the notion of public policy, the Court em-
phasized that the primary purpose of the patent law is to serve the public
interest."' This focus on the public interest set the stage for a key implica-
tion of the Morton Salt opinion: The defendant need not show direct
damage from the behavior that qualifies as patent misuse.4" Rather, a de-
struse relationship between things in which individually there is no right-a legal concept which either
is very profound or almost unintelligible, I cannot be quite sure which." Id. at 679.
42. Such concern prompted one scholar to note in 1938 that "in the past two decades, the patent
has emerged as the greatest single monopolistic device." See Feuer, supra note 14, at 1145-46. Similar
concerns prompted Congressional inquiries and efforts by President Roosevelt to reform the patent
laws. See id. at 1145; see also Mercoid, 320 U.S. at 667 (expressing concern that if the court enforced
the patent rights in the case, patent holders would obtain by contract what patents alone may grant
thereby carving out exceptions the antitrust laws, which Congress has not sanctioned).
43. The misuse case cited was Am. Lecithin Co. v. Warfield Co., IO5 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1939). See
G.S. Suppiger Co. v. Morton Salt Co., 31 F. Supp. 876 (N.D. Ill. 1940).
44. See G.S. Suppiger Co., 31 F. Supp. at 876 (N.D. I11. 1940). The patent holder argued that the
misuse argument should prevail because the patent holder could not obtain a full monopoly in salt
tablets by its action. The trial court rejected this argument on the grounds that the Clayton Act only
required a partial monopoly. See id.
45. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 490 (1942) (describing the seventh
circuit opinion).
46. Id. at 490, 492.
47. Id. at 492.
48. See Trade Regulation-Attempted Partial Monopoly of Unpatented Product as Defense to Suit
for Direct Infringement, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 882, 884 (1942). The Supreme Court would amplify this
logic in the Mercoid case, noting that:
[i]t is the public interest which is dominant in the patent system. It is the protection of the
public in a system of free enterprise which alike nullifies a patent where any part of it is in-
valid and denies to the patentee after issuance the power to use it in such a way as to ac-
quire a monopoly which is not plainly within the terms of the grant.
See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 66i, 665-66 (1944) (citations omitted).
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fendant has standing to raise any patent holder behavior that qualifies as
misuse in a defense against an infringement suit.
For example, in Morton Salt the defendant, a maker of salt-injecting
machines, was complaining about the patent holder's efforts to monopo-
lize a sector of the salt market.49 In an antitrust case, participants in the
relevant sector of the salt market might have had standing to complain
about the patentee's behavior in that market, but not a maker of the in-
jecting machines." In Morton Salt, however, the Court gave the defen-
dant standing to raise patent holder misbehavior that the defendant
could not have raised in an action based on the antitrust laws. This re-
laxed standing approach reinforces the notion that patent misuse is in-
tended to extend farther than antitrust.
In establishing the relaxed standing approach for the doctrine of
misuse, the Supreme Court may have been influenced by the increasingly
wide net cast by patent holders as they brought suit against infringers and
contributory infringers. For example, consider the Carbice case. Carbice
concerned a firm that held the patent on a container for shipping refrig-
erated foods using solid carbon dioxide." The novelty of the container
consisted of putting the carbon dioxide in the middle of the food, which
created additional insulation for the refrigerant. 2
In Carbice, the patent holder did not bring an infringement suit
against someone else trying to sell the patented containers. 3 Rather, the
patent holder's complaint followed a far more circuitous route. The pat-
ent holder brought suit against carbon dioxide sellers on the grounds that
49. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 490-91. Although the defendant also made salt tablets, the Court
specifically noted that nothing turned on that fact and that the case could be resolved by assuming that
the defendant only made salt-injecting machines. See id. The Court then turned to consideration of the
defendant's claim that the patent holder was using its machine patent monopoly to restrain competi-
tion in the salt market. See id. at 491.
50. See Albert R. Henry, Limitations Inherent in the Grant of Letters Patent, 27 CORNELL L.Q.
214, 236 (942) (expressing surprise over the Morton Salt case and noting that the remedies under Sec-
tions 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act would not have been available to the defendant). The relaxed stand-
ing rule has a particularly strong impact as the antitrust standing rules develop more fully. For
example, a nascent firm might not be able to meet the preparedness test for antitrust standing and yet
could still face an infringement suit. The relaxed standing requirement of the misuse doctrine has re-
ceived academic attention, both critical and supportive. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Comment, The
Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1599 (1990) (critical); but see
Note, Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete?, IIo HARV. L. REV. 1922. 1939 (1997) (arguing that al-
though the substantive test for misuse should be subsumed under an antitrust analysis, the relaxed
standing requirements of misuse should be maintained).
51. Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 29 (1981).
52. See Note, Contributory Infringement in Patent Litigation, 40 YALE L.J. 1328, 1330-31 (193).
53. Carbice, 283 U.S. at 30.
December 20o3]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
they were contributing to infringement by those who were using the con-
tainers in an unauthorized fashion.
5 4
The patent holder in Carbice did not make any of the containers it
held the patent on nor did it formally license others to make the contain-
ers.55 Its sole business was manufacturing and selling carbon dioxide. 6
Each carbon dioxide invoice notified purchasers that they were only
permitted to use the carbon dioxide in containers sold or approved by
the plaintiff and that containers sold or approved by the plaintiff could
only use plaintiff's carbon dioxide. 7 The Court noted, however, that the
plaintiff showed no interest in exercising control over the containers its
customers used. 8
The patent holder brought suit against Carbice, another carbon
dioxide seller. Although the Court did not set out the argument clearly in
the opinion, plaintiff's argument must have been based on the following
logic: The notices on the carbon dioxide invoices constituted an implicit
license to use the containers that had been purchased, even though the
plaintiff did not tell its customers that certain containers were approved
for purchase or give particular container manufacturers the right to sell
containers. 9 The license to use the container was in turn conditioned on
using the plaintiff's carbon dioxide. Thus, when the customers switched
to purchasing someone else's carbon dioxide, the customers were violat-
ing terms of the implicit license to use the patented container. By selling
carbon dioxide to plaintiff's customers despite knowledge of the terms on
the invoices, Carbice was a contributory infringer.6°
The Supreme Court characterized the plaintiff's claim as an attempt
to require licensees of a patented product to purchase unpatented sup-
plies from the patent holder as well.6' The Court saw Carbice as indistin-
guishable from Motion Picture Patents in that in both cases, patent
holders attempted to reach beyond the limits of the rights granted by the
patent.62 The Court deemed this type of control beyond the scope of the
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 29-30.
57. Id. at 30.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 30-31.
6o. Id. at 30.
61. Modern descriptions of Carbice tend to spare readers the torturous details of the case, using
instead the Court's characterization of the case as a refusal to license a patented combination to any-
one who would not buy supplies from the patent holder. The case details may be useful, however, for
understanding the Court's concern that the patent holder appeared to be trying to use a patent in one
market to gain control over another market, as well as the Court's eventual development of the re-
laxed standing requirement in this line of cases.
62. Carbice, 283 U.S. at 33.
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patent holder's monopoly6 3 and declined to enforce an infringement suit
based upon rights arising under the patent laws.6' In an historic context,
one can see the Court in the Carbice line of cases struggling to ensure
that patent holders, by creatively couching their licensing and selectively
choosing defendants, could not insulate their behavior from scrutiny.6'
By the mid-1940s, the Supreme Court had delineated the basic out-
line of patent misuse. A patent holder commits patent misuse by trying
improperly to extend the time or scope of the patent grant. By such be-
havior, the patent holder acts outside the rights granted under the patent
laws. Courts will refuse to enforce patent rights when a patent holder has
engaged in misuse, at least until the patent holder has relinquished the
misuse and the harm has dissipated.66
The logic of patent misuse must flow from the logic of patent policy.
Antitrust doctrine may provide insight into why behavior might be sus-
pect under the patent laws. In other words, an analysis of why we dislike
tying in antitrust circumstances may provide insight into why we dislike it
in the context of patent policy. Nevertheless, the foundation of a patent
misuse case must rest on patent principles, not antitrust.
In order to constitute misuse, a patent holder's behavior need not
rise to the level of a full antitrust violation. This notion is consistent with
the view that patent misuse is tested under patent policy, not antitrust
policy. Thus, while the behavior may be insufficient for a Sherman Act or
Clayton Act violation, it may still constitute misuse. 67
B. ARE ALL EXTENSIONS UNREASONABLE?
The doctrine of patent misuse rests on the notion that a patent
holder may not try to extend the time or scope of the patent grant. The
problem of identifying commercial behavior that extends the time and
63. For a good list of articles from the late i93OS and early i94os exploring the notion that use of
a tying clause is outside the scope of the patent monopoly, see sources cited supra note 28.
64. Carbice, 283 U.S. at 30.
65. For example, if the antitrust rules, including that antitrust standing rules, had been applied to
test for improper patent holder behavior in an infringement suit, patent holders could have chosen to
proceed only against indirect infringers. Indirect infringers would not have had standing to raise a va-
riety of improper patent holder behavior, and those with proper standing would not have been a party
to the suit. By this tactic, patent holders could have blocked defenses based on improper patent holder
behavior.
66. See Patents- Extent of Use of Patent- Use of Tying Agreement Bars Patentee in Infringement
Suit, 9 U. CHI. L. REv. 518, 520 (1941-42) (citing B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495,497-98 (1942)).
67. See S. REP. No. ioo-83, at 65 (1987) (Senate Judiciary Committee Report, on bill ultimately
not adopted by Congress, describing the current status of patent misuse law); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140-41 (196o); Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes &
Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 641 (947) (describing this rule in dicta while citing Morton Salt Co. v. Sup-
piger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942)).
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scope of the grant, however, would be more nuanced and difficult than
the early decisions might have suggested.68 As the doctrine developed
further in the 1950s and i96os, patent holders asked the courts for addi-
tional freedom in defining contract terms. Recognizing the need for some
flexibility in commercial arrangements, courts would struggle with
behaviors that nominally appeared to extend the time or scope of the
patent but seemed acceptable under patent principles.
For example, under patent misuse, a patent holder may not extract
royalties for use of a patented invention after the patent has expired.
6
,
Such an agreement would represent an extension of the time of the pat-
ent. 0 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in dicta signaled its willingness to
68. The practice of tying, which helped launch the doctrine of patent misuse, would prove to be
far more complicated than it appeared at the time of the Clayton Act and the early patent misuse
cases. In this early period, courts and commentators assumed that all tying should be prohibited
thereby requiring application of a per se rule against tying.
In a classic per se rule under the antitrust laws, we assume that the behavior is so likely to be dan-
gerous that we do not require the type of proof of market power and anticompetitive effects that we
require in other types of antitrust cases, and we generally do not allow defenses that might be weighed
against the anticompetitive effects. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 33
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); 9 PHILIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1 I72oa at 258 (1991); Robert
H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J.
373, 384 (1966). In contrast, the per se rule applied in antitrust tying cases has evolved such that anti-
trust law now requires proof that the defendant has market power and some proof of potential anti-
competitive effects and allows a variety of defenses. See Robin C. Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in
Antitrust, 87 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2109-12 (1999) (describing the per se rule in tying cases compared to clas-
sic per se rules in antitrust). The test is still streamlined in comparison to the broader rule of reason
inquiry in antitrust, but it is a far cry from the classic per se rule. The implication of this more nuanced
approach to tying is that tying is not bad in all cases, at least not in the context of things that concern
the antitrust laws.
69. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33-34 (1964).
70. See id. See also I HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., § 3.3b3 at 3-24 (2o02 & 2003 Supp.) (noting
that although Brulotte is considered the classic case for this principle, it is unclear whether the Brulotte
opinion technically invoked the patent misuse doctrine given that the court merely refused to enforce
collection of those royalties that accrued after expiration of the patents).
An interesting aspect of the question of expanding protection beyond what is offered by patent
law has been the Supreme Court's efforts to determine the extent to which state trade secret and un-
fair competition laws can reach to provide protection in areas that might be subject to patent protec-
tion before those laws run afoul of the supremacy of federal patent law. The potency of the supremacy
doctrine in this area has varied from strong supremacy in the Sears/Compco cases to weak supremacy
in the Kewanee and Aronson cases and then to an attempt in Bonito Boats to revive the strength of
Sears/Compco without creating an overly rigid structure while harmonizing the intervening prece-
dents. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Aronson v. Quick
Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979); Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (i974); Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234
(1964).
In Aronson, a case weakening supremacy, the Court took great pains to demonstrate that its de-
cision was consistent with the logic used in Brulotte in refusing to enforce a contract for post-
expiration royalties. See Aronson 440 U.S. at 264-65, 266-67 (majority and concurring opinions both
explaining the decision's consistency with Brulotte). Although the article's focus is confined to compar-
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allow payments that extended beyond the expiration of the patent if they
were analogous to extended payments for use prior to the expiration of
the patent.
The issue arose as part of a series of three cases, which I will refer to
as Radio i, Brulotte, and Radio 2. In these cases, one can see the Court
grappling with the question of whether some behaviors that appear to ex-
tend the time and scope of the patent might be acceptable under patent
principles and searching for a test that would involve some form of equi-
table balancing.
In Automatic Radio v. Hazeltine Research ("Radio i"), the Supreme
Court considered a license to use a group of patents in return for a per-
centage of revenues from the final product. 7' The license holder chal-
lenged the provision as patent misuse on the ground that the agreement
could require a payment on sales even if none of the patents was used.73
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding that the ar-
rangement was not "unreasonable." Rather, it represented sound busi-
ness judgment of the most convenient method of fixing value because it
allowed the parties to avoid the effort of having to determine whether
each radio embodied a particular patent. 4
In a case from the same period, however, the Supreme Court con-
sidered a package license of a dozen patents used in a harvesting ma-
chine.75 Royalties were based on a percentage of the crop yield and
continued to accrue beyond the expiration of all of the relevant patents.76
The Court concluded that the arrangement constituted misuse by extend-
ing the length of the patent term, but distinguished Radio i, stressing that
the arrangement in Radio i was "reasonable and convenient. ''7
Finally, almost twenty years after Radio i, the Supreme Court
considered the same licensing practice by the same radio company.78 This
time, however, the Court framed the question in different terms, and
ing patent misuse and antitrust analysis, an interesting future exploration would be the interaction be-
tween patent misuse and the supremacy line of cases.
71. In dicta in Zenith Radio, the Supreme Court read Brulotte as recognizing that patent holders
may lawfully charge a royalty for practicing an invention prior to the expiration date but postpone the
payment of those royalties beyond that time. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395
U.S. 100, 136 (1969).
72. See Automatic Radio Mfg., Inc. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 829 (1950) [herein-
after "Radio r"].
73- Id. at 39.
74. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 0o, 137 (1969) [hereinafter
"Radio 2"] (describing Radio i).
75. See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 29-30 (1964).
76. Id.
77. See id. at 32-33.
78. See Radio 2, 395 U.S. at too.
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reached the opposite result from Radio 1. 79 The Court found that the ar-
rangement potentially required payment for products that did not incor-
porate the teachings of the patent at all, and concluded that the license
extended the scope of the patent beyond the invention specified in the
patent grant. 80
How could one determine, however, whether the agreement was a
reasonable business convenience consistent with rights granted under a
patent or whether it was the result of improper patent holder behavior?
The Radio 2 Court held that the question would turn on a detailed fac-
tual examination of the contract negotiations to determine whether the
patent holder used the power of its patent to override the objections of
the licensee."
The effort to focus on whether the agreement was a reasonable and
convenient business arrangement may have flowed from a simple neces-
sity to distinguish Radio i. The focus, nevertheless, is consistent with
general doctrines of equity, and it is equity that is applied in a suit to en-
join infringement."' Equity is a question of balance in which the Court
will consider whether it would do a greater injury by granting the injunc-
tion, for example, than by refusing to act."' Such a balancing includes an
examination of the public interest. 84
79. The Court may have been more inclined to be hostile towards the licensing arrangement this
time given a lower court's finding that the patent holder had participated in a conspiracy to exclude
the defendant from the Canadian market in violation of the antitrust laws. See Radio 2 at 105-07.
Thus, the Court in Radio 2 was willing to accept what was essentially the dissent's argument in Ra-
dio i.
8o. See Radio 2,395 U.S. at 138.
8i. See id. at 139-40 (describing the test and remanding for further proceedings under the test).
82. See CHARLES W. BACON & FRANKLYN S. MORSE, THE REASONABLENESS OF THE LAW 97
, 
181-82
(1924) (describing the evolution of the doctrine of equity and noting that the common law provides
damages as a remedy while equity evolved to address wrongful acts that cannot be sufficiently ad-
dressed by monetary awards); cf. Robert P. Merges, Reflections on Current Legislation Affecting Patent
Misuse, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y, 793-94 (1988) (arguing against the pitfalls of relying on a
rule of reason analysis and in favor of the flexible judicial approach that has evolved in patent misuse
over the years embodied in the notion of reasonableness).
83. See, e.g., Richard's Appeal, 57 Pa. 105, 114 (1868) (refusing an injunction against coal burn-
ing); see also PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW'S CONSCIENCE 151-52 (1990) (describing post Civil War
development of the notion of balancing in equity cases).
84. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 724 (noting that federal equity courts
may refuse to enforce or protect legal rights the exercise of which may be prejudicial to the public in-
terest for it is in the public interest that federal courts of equity should exercise their discretionary
power); City of N.Y. v. Pine, I85 U.S. 93, 98-99 (1902) (noting that a court of equity is never active in
granting relief which would run against conscience or public convenience); Knoth v. Manhattan R.
Co., 79 N.E. 1015, ioi8 (N.Y. 19o7) (a court of equity is not bound to issue an injunction when it will
produce great public or private mischief merely for the purpose of protecting a technical or unsubstan-
tial right).
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A key maxim of equity dictates that one who requests equity must
have clean hands."s This maxim invites examination of the behavior of
the patent holder, the party seeking the equitable remedy of an injunc-
tion. The principles of equity, however, allow flexibility concerning be-
havior that appears to constitute unclean hands. For example, suppose a
defendant asserts that a suit cannot be maintained because the plaintiff
has delayed bringing suit and, therefore, has unclean hands. A court may
rule that the delay is reasonable given that it did not affect the equities in
the case.86 In other words, even behavior that appears to constitute un-
clean hands may be acceptable depending on how it affects the underly-
ing principles at stake. This notion is consistent with the view that a
court, when faced with behavior that appears to extend the physical or
temporal scope of a patent grant may ask whether that behavior is never-
theless consistent with underlying patent principles.
The notion of applying a flexible test under equitable principles
while following the dictates of patent law is sound. The focus of the
Court's inquiry in Radio 2, however, is problematic. The Court focused
the inquiry on an examination of whether the licensee entered into the
agreement voluntarily."s As one authority notes, "[c]ontract law has
rightly shied away from inquiring into whether one party 'wanted' to
agree to a contractual provision in all but the most egregious cases. '
The inquiry invites self-serving testimony and encourages strategic be-
havior in which parties try to include evidence of voluntariness into the
contract.89 It is unlikely to provide a helpful dividing line.'
85. See BACON & MORSE, supra note 82, at 196. Interestingly, an early unclean hands case involved
what would later become a trademark right. In Fetridge v. Wells, 4 Abb. Pr. 144 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1857),
the manufacturer of a product sold as "The Balm of a Thousand Flowers" sued to enjoin the defen-
dants from manufacturing "The Balm of Ten Thousand Flowers." The court refused to enter the in-
junction on the grounds that the original manufacturer was perpetrating a fraud on the public because
the product was neither a balm nor a cosmetic. See BACON & MORSE, supra note 82, at 197. The court
denied the injunction noting that "[tihose who come into a court of equity seeking equity, must come
with pure hands and a pure conscience .... An exclusive privilege for deceiving the public is assuredly
not one that a court of equity can be required to aid or sanction." Id. (quoting the decision).
86. See Wafer Shave, Inc. v. Gillette Co., 857 F. Supp. 112, 128 (D. Mass. 1993).
87. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. oo, 138 (I969) (noting the im-
portance of exploring the details of the license negotiations to demonstrate that the patent holder co-
erced the terms at issue in the case and holding that such a conclusion cannot be inferred from the
agreement itself); see also id. at 141 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)(arguing that
the majority's opinion will require an inquiry into whether the provision was included at the insistence
of both parties or only at the will of the patent holder, an inquiry that will be difficult to make).
88. 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 37, § 3.3, at 3-22 (discussing Radio 2 and its progeny).
89. See id.
9o. Lower courts are mixed on whether to extend the voluntariness inquiry to a related category
of cases in which two patents are licensed for a fixed royalty and the patent holder continues to charge
the same royalty after one of the patents has expired. See id. § 3.3, at 3-25 (describing these cases); 6
CHISUM, supra note 7, § 19-0 4 131[d], at 19-476 (noting that these cases fall at the intersection of three
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Moreover, focusing on whether the agreement was voluntary ignores
the question of whether the agreement is ultimately in the public interest.
An agreement may be appealing to both of the parties, yet may still cre-
ate systemic effects that are inconsistent with the goals of the patent sys-
tem.9'
C. ABORTED ATrEMPTS TO PROVIDE THAT PATENT MISUSE REQUIRES A
VIOLATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Through the early i98os, courts defined patent misuse in terms of
whether a patent holder had improperly extended the time or scope of
the patent grant, a question which was to be answered according to pat-
ent principles. In 1986, however, the Federal Circuit reframed the test in
antitrust terms. In the Windsurfing case, Chief Judge Markey of the Fed-
eral Circuit explained that to prove patent misuse, "the alleged infringer
must show that the patentee has impermissibly broadened the 'physical
or temporal scope' of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect."92 The
Court explained further that the key inquiry in patent misuse should "re-
veal whether the overall effect of the behavior tends to restrain competi-
tion in an appropriately defined market."'
With a few strokes of the pen, the Federal Circuit added a new re-
quirement for patent misuse. To constitute misuse, a patent holder's be-
havior must not only extend the time or scope of the patent, it must also
create anticompetitive effects. The Federal Circuit thereby turned away
from the Supreme Court's admonition to test patent misuse by patent
policy, blending in a test based on antitrust doctrine.
In support of its language, the Federal Circuit cited a 1971 Supreme
Court case, Blonder-Tongue. The Blonder-Tongue case, however, does
not contain Windsurfing's language or its test.'
lines of cases: mandatory package licenses, total-sales royalty structures, and post-expiration royal-
ties); compare Rocform Corp. v. Acitelli-Standard Concrete Wall, Inc., 367 F.2d 678, 680 (6th Cir.
1966) (invalidating the agreement as an illegal extension of the patent grant), with Hull v. Brunswick,
704 F.2d 1195, 1203-o4 (ioth Cir. 1983) (agreement could remain in force as long as one patent con-
tinued unless the license the license is involuntary).
91. See infra text accompanying notes 199-2oo and text following note 212 (describing the poten-
tial for Reach-Through Royalties to create improper systemic effects despite the fact that both parties
may perceive the agreement to be in their interests).
92. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1oo1 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 1001-02.
94. See Robert J. Hoerner, The Decline (and Fall?) of the Patent Misuse Doctrine in the Federal
Circuit, 69 ANTITRUST LJ. 669, 672-73 (2002) (noting that the citation of Blonder-Tongue after the
words "with anticompetitive effect" could be regarded as misleading because the words did not appear
in Blonder-Tongue, but were an addition to the quotation by then-Chief Judge Markey); see also
Patricia A. Martone & Richard M. Feustel, Jr., The Patent Misuse Defense-Does It Still Have Viabil-
ity?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTIRUST, at 250 (2002) (noting that the Federal Circuit in Windsurf-
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The Federal Circuit in Windsurfing did try to avoid defying Supreme
Court doctrine. The Windsurfing court suggested that it would only apply
the antitrust analysis to behavior that the Supreme Court had not previ-
ously declared per se misuse.9' This approach avoided appearing to con-
tradict the Supreme Court but imposed a limitation in which prior
Supreme Court cases would create precedent only for similar behaviors
but would not establish general rules for the doctrine of misuse.
This approach echoes per se analysis in antitrust law, which courts
generally apply only when they have sufficient experience with a type of
behavior to predict that the conduct is almost always anticompetitive.
96
Thus, the Federal Circuit implied that the Supreme Court had not estab-
lished general rules for patent misuse but merely indicated particular cir-
cumstances in which it had sufficient experience to declare that the
behavior was most likely anticompetitive. Once again, the Federal Cir-
cuit borrowed from antitrust doctrine to limit patent misuse.
Within nine months, however, Judge Markey backed off from the
position staked out in Windsurfing,9 thereby avoiding the appearance of
contradicting Supreme Court precedent as well as the less than judicious
implication that the Supreme Court did not have sufficient experience
for the broad declarations it had made in the patent misuse area. In the
Senza-Gel case, Judge Markey retreated to the holding that patent mis-
use did not require antitrust type findings. 98 In contrast to the declara-
tions in Windsurfing, Judge Markey confined his views to a footnote in
which he deferred to Congress and the Supreme Court to make the
changes attempted in Windsurfling.
Commentators and courts have questioned the rationale appearing in
Supreme Court opinions dealing with misuse in view of recent eco-
nomic theory and Supreme Court decisions in non-misuse contexts.
[see Windsurfing]. We are bound, however, to adhere to existing Su-
ing required antitrust-type findings of relevant market and anticompetitive effects to support a finding
of an attempt to extend the scope of the monopoly which are elements not required by existing case
law including Supreme Court precedent).
95. Windsurfing, 782 F.2d at ooi-o2.
96. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1982); see also Cont'l
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,50 n.16 (1977).
97. See William J. Gilbreth & William H. Steinmetz, The Patent Misuse Defense-Its Expansion
and Contraction, J. PROPRIETARY RTs. 7, 13 (1992) (noting that in Senza-Gel, the Federal Circuit
thought better of its pronouncements in Windsurfing); Hoerner, supra note 94, at 673-74.
98. Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 66i, 676 (Fed. Cir. 1986). In Senza-Gel, the Federal
Circuit approved a lower court test for misuse in a tying context that did not require proof of market
power or anticompetitive effects. Thus, the Federal Circuit upheld a summary judgment of misuse in
favor of the defendant. On a charge of violation of antitrust laws, the court again upheld a lower court
finding that the issue could not be resolved on summary judgment, and that the defendant would have
to present further evidence of market power and anticompetitive effects. The rulings thereby empha-
sized the different requirements for patent misuse and antitrust.
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preme Court guidance in the area until otherwise directed by Congress
or by the Supreme Court."
The Windsurfing case arose against the backdrop of a debate over
whether to conform patent misuse to antitrust rules. Scholars and legisla-
tors weighed in on both sides of the debate,'"' with the Administration
backing a proposal to test all patent misuse cases under antitrust stan-
dards.' 1 Arguments in favor of conforming patent misuse to antitrust
standards included the notion that patent misuse provides a harsh sanc-
tion, that the misuse rules are too rigid for the economic realities of the
marketplace, and that the more robust economic doctrines embodied in
modern antitrust law would provide better guidance."' As Judge Posner
noted in the USM case, "[o]ur law is not rich in alternative concepts of
monopolistic abuse.' 0 3
Arguments against conforming patent misuse to antitrust standards
included that courts had shown sufficient flexibility in applying the pat-
ent misuse rules; that patent misuse serves as a valuable counter-weight
to equitable doctrines that favor the patent holder; that technology mar-
kets, in which patents frequently operate, have characteristics distinct
from other types of markets; and that the antitrust rules are notoriously
difficult to apply.' 4 As one scholar commented, "[I]t is ironic indeed that
advocates of greater certainty in the law of patent misuse would propose
a unified rule of reason approach when this is arguably one of the least
certain legal rules ever propounded."'0 5
In 1988, the Senate passed a bill that would have prohibited a finding
of patent misuse unless the patent holder's "practices or actions or inac-
tions.., violate the antitrust laws."' 6 In a cloakroom compromise in the
waning days of the iooth Congress, however, the House and Senate
99. Id. at 665 n.5.
1oo. Compare Competition Policy and the Patent Misuse Doctrine, Remarks by Roger B.
Andewelt, Chief Intellectual Property Section, Antitrust Division Before the Bar Association for the
District of Columbia Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Section, Nov. 3, 1982, reprinted in 25 Pat.,
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 41 (1982), and USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505,
511-12 (7th Cir. 1982) (arguing that misuse claims should be tested by conventional antitrust princi-
ples), with PREPARED STATEMENT OF Louis Kaplow, Hearings on H.R. 557, Apr. 30, 1987, and Robert P.
Merges, Reflections on Current Legislation Affecting Patent Misuse, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'Y. 793 (I988).
sot. S. REP. No. loo-83, at 67 (1987) (reporting on bill embodying the approach passed by the
Senate but not ultimately adopted).
102. See sources cited supra notes ioo-os.
103. USM Corp. v. SPS, 694 F.2d at 512.
Io4. See sources cited supra notes Ioo-oi.
lo5 . Merges, supra note 82, at 794.
lo6. Jere M. Webb & Lawrence A. Locke, Intellectual Property Misuse: Developments in the Mis-
use Doctrine, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 257, 264 (citing Intellectual Property Antitrust Protection Act of
1988 S. 438 § 2oi, iooth Cong. § 2oi (1988)).
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reached agreement on a different version that was far less sweeping.
Rather than applying antitrust rules across the board to all of patent mis-
use, the final language related only to tying. In the case of tying, the lan-
guage prohibited a finding of misuse unless the patent holder had market
power.
Thus, following the 1988 Act, the law of patent misuse for issues
other than tying stood as it had been before. In order to constitute mis-
use, a patent holder's behavior did not need to constitute an antitrust
violation. Rather, analysis of patent holder behavior for the purposes of
patent misuse had to be derived from patent policy.
II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT CASTS OUT IN A NEW DIRECTION
Over the next decade, the Federal Circuit adopted a test bearing
only passing resemblance to the law as it stood after the 1988 Act. In par-
ticular, current Federal Circuit doctrine as a general rule requires appli-
cation of the antitrust rule of reason in order to support a finding of
patent misuse."°
The Federal Circuit doctrine is at odds with legislative and judicial
precedents. Worse yet, the doctrine is convoluted and difficult to follow.
To understand the path that has taken the Federal Circuit to this result, it
is helpful to separate out three types of questions and to identify how
Io7. For a detailed description of the path of House and Senate Versions and the final compromise
language, see Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform: "Blessed be the Tie?", 4 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. I, 2 n.9 (i99i); see also Webb & Locke, supra note io6; Bennett, Patent Misuse: Must an
Alleged Infringer Prove an Antitrust Violation?, 17 A.I.P.L.A. Q.J. 1 (1989).
IO8. The relevant language prohibits a finding of misuse upon "condition[ing] the license of any
rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in an-
other patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner
has market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the license or
sale is conditioned." 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2000).
The final bill also prohibits finding misuse for a complete refusal to license or use rights. This is-
sue relates to suppression of an invention, and suppression is not the focus of the current article. For a
discussion of the issue, see Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deter-
rent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389 (2002); Seungwoo Son, Selective Refusals to
Sell Patented Goods: The Relationship Between Patent Rights and Antitrust Law, 2002 ILL. J.L., TECH. &
POL'Y io9; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) ("No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement
or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal
extension of the patent right by reason of his having.., refused to license or use any rights to the pat-
ent .... ).
to9. See Virginia Panel Corp. v. Mac Panel Co., 133 F.3d 86o, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing antitrust
cases and holding that if a practice has not been declared per se misuse or per se not misuse, the prac-
tice must be analyzed in accordance with the rule of reason); B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124
F.3d 1419, 1426-27 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (instructing the lower court on remand to evaluate the restriction
under the rule of reason); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (anti-
competitive effects that are not per se violations of patent misuse law are reviewed in accordance with
the rule of reason).
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patent and antitrust law address each. Although the line between the
questions is not absolute, the failure to navigate them carefully has con-
tributed to the current doctrinal confusion in patent misuse.
The questions are: (i) what harm is the law trying to identify; (2)
what type of test will be used to identify it; and (3) what elements will be
considered under the test. For example, the courts may choose to apply a
balancing test to determine whether patent misuse has occurred. That
does not, however, resolve the question of whether courts should use the
antitrust version of the balancing test. More importantly, it does not re-
solve the question of whether the factors weighed in the balancing test
should be the same factors an antitrust test would consider.
A. ANTITRUST DOCTRINE
Antitrust doctrine provides the following answers to each of the
three questions. At a most general level, antitrust law seeks to protect
competition and prevent the improper use and creation of monopoly
with its resultant anticompetitive effects in the marketplace."'
The basic antitrust test is a form of a balancing test known as the
rule of reason. It is not a simple balancing test, in which the court weighs
issues on both sides and arrives at a considered judgment of what is fair
and equitable under the totality of the circumstances."' Rather, the anti-
trust rule of reason focuses on one particular issue: the impact on compe-
tition, rather than all possible equitable considerations. In addition, the
test has formal thresholds and elements The test looks for market power,
anticompetitive effects and proof that the anticompetitive effects out-
weigh the pro-competitive benefits."2 These thresholds and elements can
be burdensome to establish."3 In fact, the test is so difficult to satisfy that
Judge Posner, no fan of the restrictions of antitrust law, has been cited as
IIO. See, e.g., PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, I iooa, at 3-4; see also 2
EARL W. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § II.I (i980) (primary goal of Sherman Act § 2 monopo-
lization rule is to prevent a firm or group of firms from acquiring or maintaining monopoly power
through abusive or inequitable practices). These terms are subject to considerable ambiguity, although
they have developed particular meaning in the context of antitrust law. See id.
I I I. See HOFFER, supra note 83, at 177-78.
112. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note IIo, at 345-46 (describing the rule of reason test).
113. The classic treatise on antitrust describes the rule of reason as requiring a series of steps. First,
the plaintiff has the initial burden of showing that the behavior restrains competition in a specific mar-
ket. Second, it the plaintiff meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that its
behavior serves legitimate objectives. Third, if the defendant meets that burden, the plaintiff may
show that the defendant could meet its objective using less restrictive alternatives. And finally, the
court must weigh the harms and benefits of the restraint with the plaintiff bearing the burden to show
that the restraint is unreasonable on balance. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note Ito, 91 1502. at
345-46, 371-72 (2d ed. 2000).
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saying that the rule of reason is essentially a "euphemism for nonliability
[sic]."''4
Given the burdensome nature of the rule of reason, courts have es-
tablished a streamlined test when experience shows that the nature and
effects of the behavior are so likely to be anticompetitive that it is unnec-
essary to examine the behavior in the particular circumstances of the
case."5 The per se test for tying in antitrust law is really a hybrid of this
approach and the rule of reason. Although it is a streamlined test, it still
requires some examination of particular circumstances and effects. '
B. BLURRING THE LINES DURING THE 1988 ACT SENATE DEBATE
As described above, in the final language of the 1988 Act, Congress
changed only the patent misuse law relating to tying. Moreover, Con-
gress changed the law by borrowing an element from the antitrust bal-
ancing test. In particular, Congress mandated that there can be no
finding of misuse without market power.
Borrowing an element from the antitrust balancing test is not the
same as mandating the use of the entire antitrust test. In statements pre-
sented at the time that the final language was introduced, however, Sena-
tor DeConcini attempted to broaden the meaning of the language.
Senator DeConcini argued that "[w]hile not mandating an antitrust
test, the legislation nonetheless imposes a rule-of-reason-type analysis
before a tie-in can be held to constitute misuse-and not just a general
reasonable analysis, but one with a particular set of elements in mind."" 7
Thus, rather than simply adding a market power requirement, Senator
DeConcini argued that the final language replaces both the type of test
to be applied and all of the elements to be considered. Specifically, the
DeConcini approach replaces the "reasonable" analysis of a general eq-
114. Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflection on the Sylva-
nia Decision, 45 U. CH. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977); Hearings on H.R. 557, supra note 1oo, at 129 (quoting the
Posner language).
I15. See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978); Northwest Whole-
sale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationary & Printing Co., 472, U.S. 284, 298 (985).
116. See supra note 68 (describing the antitrust test for tying).
117. 134 CONG. REc. S 7 ,14 7 (1988).
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uitable inquiry with the type of balancing test applied in antitrust law
plus all of the elements of the antitrust test.' 8
Senator Leahy, who had authored the language that the Senate
originally approved, also tried to soften the impact of Congress's failure
to pass his earlier language:
While this approach is indeed different from our original patent misuse
proposal, it does not mean that Congress has rejected the earlier Sen-
ate proposal and now believes that the traditional misuse doctrine
should be retained intact in the many other areas in which it may be
applied by the courts. It only means that, because of the short time
available at the end of this Congress, the House and Senate Commit-
tees interested in these issues were able to agree on a narrower re-
form."
9
It is questionable whether the Supreme Court would find such a
strained interpretation of the language and precedent to be binding. As
the Supreme Court noted in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, "Few principles of
statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that
Congress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it
has earlier discarded in favor of other language ....0
i8. In theory, one could argue that the language of the act leaves open the possibility of adding
other requirements for patent misuse. The argument would be that the Act merely requires a finding
of market power for a misuse case involving tying; it does not say that market power is the sole ele-
ment that can be required for a misuse case involving tying, and other elements could be added later
by Congress or the Courts. Even if this were true, the language cannot be read as mandating specific
elements.
One could also argue that the DeConcini interpretation would impose an even stricter test than
was rejected by failure to pass the earlier Senate language. The original Senate language would have
required that the behavior violate the antitrust laws. For tying to violate the antitrust laws, requires
only a modified per se analysis, not a full blown rule of reason approach. Thus, Senator DeConcini's
suggestion of a rule of reason analysis would impose a patent misuse test for tying that is tougher to
meet than the antitrust test for tying.
The DeConcini language may be best understood as a struggle over whether to apply per se
rather than rule of reason analysis to tying, both for patent and antitrust. Regardless of the underlying
struggle, however, Senator DeConcini acknowledges clearly that the final language concerns only ty-
ing rather than patent misuse across the board.
119. 134 CONG. REC. S17,I47-48 (1988).
120. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 48o U.S. 421, 442-43 (1987) (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 392-93 (i98o) (Stewart, J., dissenting)); see also id. at 452-53
(Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that judges "interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators' inten-
tions. Where the language of those laws is clear, we are not free to replace it with an unenacted legisla-
tive intent."); United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267 n.6 (i997) (noting that the legislative intent of
Congress is to be derived from the language and structure of the statute itself, if possible, not from the
assertions of codifiers directly at odds with clear statutory language); cf. Grid Sys. Corp. v. Texas In-
struments, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 1033, 1037 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 199I) (declining the invitation to use the legisla-
tive history of the 1988 Act language to find that the Act altered antitrust law and noting that although
some legislators did favor such an exception, a full reading of the record reveals that Congress rejected
the extension despite this articulate support). But see In re Recombinant DNA, 85o F. Supp. 769, 777
(S.D. Ind. I994) (referring to the Leahy remarks in interpreting the 1988 Act to cover both "tie-ins"
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C. BLURRING THE LINES IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Following the 1988 Act, if a patent holder engages in tying behavior,
there can be no finding of misuse without a finding that the patent holder
has market power. The law for other forms of patent misuse, however,
remains unchanged.'"' Thus, under Supreme Court doctrine, in order to
constitute misuse, a patent holder's behavior need not constitute an anti-
trust violation. Rather, analysis of patent holder behavior for the pur-
poses of patent misuse must be derived from patent policy.
In the 1992 Mallinckrodt v. Medipart case, however, the Federal Cir-
cuit altered the law by requiring a full-blown antitrust analysis in a patent
misuse case that did not relate to tying.' In this opinion, the court not
only required more than market power but added this requirement to
patent misuse across the board. 3
The Mallinckrodt opinion cited Windsurfing as the relevant prece-
dent for patent misuse." The opinion showed no awareness of Judge
Markey's subsequent retreat from Windsurfing in Senza-Gel, in which he
acknowledged that the Federal Circuit did not have the authority to re-
quire an antitrust analysis without Congressional or Supreme Court ac-
tion. Nor did the opinion show any awareness of Congress' failure to pass
the Senate proposal which would have required an antitrust analysis. The
fact that Congress failed to approve requiring an antitrust analysis left
the Federal Circuit still lacking the authority to alter the doctrine in this
way, yet that is precisely what the court did in Mallinckrodt.
The Windsurfing test essentially followed the test for antitrust viola-
tions. As described above, antitrust seeks to protect competition and
prevent anticompetitive effects in the marketplace.' 5 One can prove such
harms in antitrust either by showing that the behavior has been declared
a per se violation or that the behavior fails the rule of reason. ' Under
the rule of reason, a court will look for market power, anticompetitive
and "tie-outs" and noting that Congress would not have fashioned a "rule-of-reason type" approach
for one form of tying arrangement and excluded from that approach another intimately related tying
situation, especially in light of its clear purpose of permitting a misuse defense only when the patentee
has acted anticompetitive); Texas Instruments Inc. v. Hyundai Elecs. Indus., Co., 49 F. Supp. 2d 893,
9o7-19 (E.D. Tex. i999) (following other portions of the Leahy language to support a full Rule of
Reason analysis for patent misuse in tying).
121. As noted before, the 1988 Act also codified a patent holder's right to suppress the invention.
See supra note io8.
122. 976 F.2d 700, 708-09 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 706.
125. See supra Part II.A.
126. See supra Part II.A.
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effects and proof that the anticompetitive effects outweigh the pro-
competitive benefits. 2
Under Windsurfing, patent misuse "requires that the alleged in-
fringer show that the patentee has impermissibly broadened the 'physical
or temporal scope' of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect. '"2' To
sustain a misuse defense, a party must show that the behavior has been
held to be per se anticompetitive by the Supreme Court or demonstrate
that "the overall effect of the license tends to restrain competition unlaw-
fully in an appropriately defined relevant market.' '29 In applying the bal-
ancing test, the court noted with approval the pro-competitive effects
related to the behavior. 3
In sum, the harm that patent misuse is testing for became focused on
improper "anticompetitive effects." One could prove such effects either
by reference to behaviors declared per se prohibited or by a balancing
test that looks for market power, and anticompetitive effects evaluated
on balance against pro-competitive effects.
Thus, the Windsurfing court drafted a test in which a claim of patent
misuse would be tested by an antitrust inquiry. 3' Mainckrodt adopted
this test, amplifying it slightly by focusing on the familiar notion of be-
havior falling inside or outside the patent grant. According to Mallinck-
rodt, the question of whether a patent holder's behavior falls outside the
scope of the patent turns on anticompetitive effects, which are measured
by the antitrust rule of reason. '32
Federal Circuit cases after Mallinckrodt showed greater loyalty to
the history of patent misuse as a doctrine separate from antitrust that
does not require a violation of the antitrust laws. For example, the Vir-
127. See supra Part II.A.
128. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF Int'l, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, iooi (Fed. Cir. 1986).
129. Id. at 1002.
130. Id.
131. Although the current Federal Circuit test appears to leave the relaxed standing requirement
in place, in theory, the standing requirement of patent misuse could be harmonized with antitrust as
well. The Senate language, which would have prohibited a finding of patent misuse unless the patent
holder's "'practices or actions or inactions.., violate the antitrust laws"' could be read to harmonize
the standing requirements as well as the substantive requirements. Webb & Locke, supra note Io6, at
264 (quoting S. 438 § 2oi).
132. The Mallinckrodt opinion states: "The appropriate criterion is whether Mallinckrodt's restric-
tion is reasonably within the patent grant, or whether the patentee has ventured beyond the patent
grant and into behavior having an anticompetitive effect not justifiable under the rule of reason." Mal-
linckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708. In addition, the court stresses the dichotomy between inside and outside the
patent grant, again implying that the difference rests on whether there are anticompetitive effects:
"Should the restriction be found to be reasonably within the patent grant ... that ends the inquiry.
However, should such inquiry lead to the conclusion that there are anticompetitive effects extending
beyond the patentee's statutory right to exclude... [the court will apply] the rule of reason." Id.
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ginia Panel opinion noted that "violation of the antitrust laws... re-
quires more exacting proof than suffices to demonstrate patent
misuse."' 3 In addition, the C.R. Bard opinion noted the following: "Pat-
ent misuse is viewed as a broader wrong than antitrust violation because
of the economic power that may be derived from the patentee's right to
exclude. Thus, misuse may arise when the conditions of antitrust viola-
tion are not met."'34 Despite the declarations that patent misuse does not
require a violation of the antitrust laws, the opinions nevertheless pro-
ceed to apply the test that determines whether an antitrust violation has
occurred.'35
Federal Circuit cases after Mallinckrodt also expanded the explana-
tion of the misuse test to include references to other misuse precedents.
Precedents that did not conform to the rule of reason inquiry were de-
scribed as examples of behaviors that are per se misuse or per se not mis-
use."6 Later Federal Circuit cases also referred to the language of the
1988 Act and the Brulotte reasonableness inquiry.'3 None of the cases,
133. Virginia Panel Corp. v. Mac Panel Co., 133 F.3 d 86o, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1997); cf. B. Braun Med.,
Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (patent misuse is a separate method of limit-
ing abuse of patent rights separate from the antitrust laws).
134. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (opinion written by judge
Newman, who also wrote the Mallinckrodt opinion).
135. One could argue that, despite the essential application of an antitrust test, the Mallinckrodt
court still offers a hint that it might not intend to apply antitrust law. In the background section, the
opinion notes that "[tihe concept of patent misuse arose to restrain practices that did not in themselves
violate any law .. " Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 704. In theory, if the sentence says patent misuse is
aimed at practices that do not violate any laws, perhaps the test for patent misuse should require
something less than what is required for a violation of the antitrust laws. The remainder of the opin-
ion, however, directly applies Windsurfing which replaces patent misuse with an antitrust test. Thus,
either the Mallinckrodt court misunderstood that Windsurfing overturned prior precedent in the area
or the background sentence is merely a historic reference, too vague to mean much of anything.
136. See B. Braun Med., 124 F.3d at 1426 (describing misuse precedents); Virginia Panel, 133 F.3d
at 869 (describing per se and rule of reason structure for patent misuse inquiry).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71; B. Braun Med., 124 F.3d at 1426 (referencing
§ 271(d)(5) of the Patent Act which embodies the 1988 Act amendments related to tying); Virginia
Panel, 133 F.3d at 869 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (referencing § 271(d)(5) as well as Brulotte).
Two of the Federal Circuit misuse cases following Mallinckrodt do include citations to Senza-Gel,
but in reference to issues unrelated to the court's retreat from the position that the misuse inquiry
should be replaced with an antitrust inquiry. See, e.g., CR. Bard, 157 F.3d at 1372 (Senza-Gel cited for
the proposition that patent misuse renders a patent unenforceable). In order to constitute misuse, a
patent holder's behavior need not constitute an antitrust violation. Rather, analysis of patent holder
behavior for the purposes of patent misuse must be derived from patent policy. B. Braun Med., 124
F.3d at 1427, 1428 n.5 (cited Senza-Gel for two propositions: (i) that patent misuse is an equitable doc-
trine in which the court refuses to help support the rights of a party with unclean hands; and (2) that
actions that support a misuse finding may also provide an element in a claim for affirmative actions
under an antitrust or breach of contract theory).
One could argue that the Federal Circuit approach follows the approach outlined in the state-
ment by Senator DeConcini. Both tests mimic the form and substance of the antitrust laws. Even if
one accepts the questionable proposition that the DeConcini statement is good authority, however, it
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however, showed any awareness that Windsurfing represented a depar-
ture from prior precedent, that the court retreated from the position in
Senza-Gel, or that the Senate failed to pass a proposal similar to Wind-
surfing in the shuffle leading up to the 1988 Act.
In later Federal Circuit cases, the test laid out in Windsurfing and
adopted in Mallinckrodt becomes clouded and difficult to follow. This
may reflect an attempt to apply antitrust in patent misuse cases with due
deference to precedents not described in Mallinckrodt. It may also reflect
a lack of clarity in applying antitrust law.
For example, as described above, the harm to be tested for under
Windsurfing focuses on improper "anticompetitive effects." One can
prove such effects either by (i) behaviors declared per se prohibited or
(2) applying the rule of reason, a test that looks for market power,
anticompetitive effects, and finally, a balancing of anticompetitive effects
against pro-competitive effects.'3
At times, Federal Circuit opinions use the term "rule of reason"
properly to describe the full test that is applied in lieu of a per se test.
139
At other times, however, the court uses the term "rule of reason" to refer
only to the portion of the test that considers whether the anticompetitive
effects are outweighed by pro-competitive benefits.4 This confusion
is not good authority for the path taken by the Federal Circuit. The DeConcini statement refers only
to the test for tying. It does not establish a general test for misuse, as the Federal Circuit does. In addi-
tion, one would also have to accept the sleight of hand that the Federal Circuit has not cited or ex-
plored the Leahy or DeConcini statements as potential authority.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 124-27.
139. For example, at one point, the court in B. Braun describes patent misuse as either identifying
behavior that falls within per se prohibitions or applying the rule of reason. Although the language is
unclear, it essentially follows the per se/rule of reason split applied in antitrust:
Two common examples of such impermissible broadening are using a patent which enjoys
market power in the relevant market to restrain competition in an unpatented product or
employing the patent beyond its 17-year term. In contrast, field of use restrictions ... are
generally upheld and any anticompetitive effects they may cause are reviewed in accor-
dance with the rule of reason.
124 F.3 d at 1426 (citations omitted). Although classic per se tests generally exclude market power in-
quiries, the fact that the court includes tying plus market power as one of the per se categories is con-
sistent with the way that antitrust law handles tying. See supra note 68.
140. For example, the Virginia Panel court describes the misuse test for circumstances outside the
realm of per se as a multi-part test in which a court must first determine if the practice is reasonably
within the patent grant. If not, and if it extends beyond the grant with anticompetitive effect, then the
court will apply the "rule of reason." 133 F.3 d at 869. Thus, the court describes the rule of reason as
entering after a finding that there are anticompetitive effects, even though a finding of anticompetitive
effects is part of the rule of reason itself.
Mallinckrodt uses a similar formulation to describe the test for those behaviors that are not per se
patent misuse:
Should the restriction be found to be reasonably within the patent grant.., that ends the
inquiry. However, should such inquiry lead to the conclusion that there are anticompetitive
effects extending beyond the patentee's statutory right to exclude, these effects do not
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makes it difficult to determine what the Federal Circuit test is and how it
should be applied.'
In addition, Federal Circuit language at times suggests that the
Court will apply a two-part test in which it would first determine whether
the behavior violates patent policy and then determine whether the be-
havior violates antitrust. 42 In other words, rather than replacing the pat-
ent inquiry with the more familiar antitrust-style inquiry, the two-part
test would require both inquiries. A defendant would have to show a
patent violation and an antitrust violation.
automatically impeach the restriction. Anticompetitive effects that are not per se violations
of law are reviewed in accordance with the rule of reason.
976 F.2d at 708. Once again, the court has already applied parts of the rule of reason test before the
point at which it would begin applying the test.
In addition, the Mallinckrodt language cited above suggests an odd formulation of per se rules on
the whole. It suggests that one asks first whether there are anticompetitive effects and then categorizes
some of those effects as per se prohibited. Although the per se rule in tying does include some consid-
eration of effects, the more general approach for a per se rule eschews any consideration of effects and
declares some behavior so likely to cause harm that it is prohibited without an inquiry into details such
as the effects in the particular case. See supra note 68.
141. It is also possible to argue that the Federal Circuit test is not a confusion of antitrust law.
Rather, the Federal Circuit judges simply do not intend to apply antitrust law and have invented their
own doctrinal forms. If that is the case, it is a strange doctrine indeed, given that it uses the language
and concepts of antitrust law, citing antitrust cases for support. See, e.g., Virginia Panel, 133 F.3d at 869
(describing the rule of reason test to be applied in patent misuse by quoting antitrust cases). Moreover,
it fails to follow patent doctrine.
142. For example, the Virginia Panel court describes the misuse test in the following manner:
When a practice alleged to constitute patent misuse is neither per se patent misuse nor spe-
cifically excluded from a misuse analysis ... a court must determine if that practice is "rea-
sonably within the patent grant .... If so, the practice does not have the effect of
broadening the scope of the patent claims and thus cannot constitute patent misuse. If, on
the other hand, the practice has the effect of extending the patentee's statutory rights and
does so with an anti-competitive effect, that practice must then be analyzed in accordance
with the "rule of reason." Under the rule of reason, "the finder of fact must decide whether
the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into ac-
count a variety of factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint's history, nature, and
effect."
Id. at 869 (citations omitted). See also Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 7o8 (using a similar formulation).
Thus, the test could be read as first applying a Radio i style reasonableness inquiry in which the court
asks whether the restraint is unreasonable under patent principles, and then an antitrust inquiry, which
focuses on anticompetitive effects under the rule of reason.
The language may be no more than an imperfect articulation of Windsurfing or an attempt to
make Windsurfing fit within the notion that patent law tests for something different from antitrust. It
may, therefore, suggest some of the difficulties of applying Windsurfing without a clear mandate to
adopt antitrust law.
Nevertheless, one district court case has applied the current Federal Circuit rule in a way that
suggests a two-step rule requiring first a Radio i style inquiry into whether the behavior extends the
patent grant and then either a per se or a rule of reason analysis. See Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms.,
Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 467 (D. Del. 2002). Under a two-step rule, a behavior still could not constitute
patent misuse unless it violated the antitrust rule of reason unless it falls within one of the precedential
per se categories.
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Finally, the doctrinal confusion is worsened by intermingling the
word "reasonable," as in a general balancing test like the one suggested
in Radio i, with the term "rule of reason," which describes a structured
test in which there are specific elements to apply and those elements
track antitrust theory.43
An additional danger of the doctrinal confusion in patent misuse is
that it may bleed over into antitrust law as courts and commentators cite
patent misuse cases for a description of what the rule of reason is or what
an inquiry into anticompetitive effect should look like. Thus, if the Fed-
eral Circuit is going to apply what is essentially antitrust law, it would be
better to ensure that it is applied clearly and properly, even if the ap-
proach is cut back to applying antitrust only in the tying arena. "
In sum, the journey to the current Federal Circuit doctrine can be
understood in the following fashion: The Federal Circuit in Windsurfing
tried to change patent misuse doctrine so that it tracks antitrust doctrine.
It then retreated from this approach in Senza-Gel. Similarly, Congress
considered changing patent misuse so that it tracked antitrust doctrine to
require finding an antitrust violation. Congress failed to approve this ap-
proach, however, adopting a provision relating to tying and mandating
only market power. Four years later, the Federal Circuit, ignoring or
perhaps missing the implication of the intervening precedents, cited and
tried to adopt the Windsurfing test. Later Federal Circuit cases have tried
143. See, e.g., Mallinckrodt and Virginia Panel language quoted in note 142. In addition, the C.R.
Bard court explains that the patent holder's competitive activities would constitute patent misuse if
there were evidence that they "were either per se patent misuse or that they were not 'reasonably
within the patent grant."' See 157 F.3d at 1373 (quoting Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708). The court
never uses the term "rule of reason" at all, but it would be hard to imagine that the author of Mal-
linckrodt would have completely abandoned that standard without any reference to the Federal Cir-
cuit cases that have relied on it. More likely, the C.R. Bard language is intended to suggest a
dichotomy between a per se approach and a rule of reason approach but ends up using the language of
open balancing rather than the language of the structured rule of reason test.
i44. In addition, some commentators have expressed concern that the Federal Circuit may be ex-
ercising too much influence in the antitrust realm without sufficient leavening effect from the view-
points of other circuits. In particular, under Federal Circuit law, the Court has jurisdiction to hear
appeals from cases that included final resolution of at least one patent claim at the trial court level,
even if no patent issues remain on appeal. Until recently, the Federal Circuit then applied regional
circuit law to non-patent claims. The Federal Circuit, however, has changed this approach such that it
now applies its own law to non-patent claims, which would include antitrust claims. See Ronald S. Katz
& Adam J. Safer, Should One Patent Court Be Making Antitrust Law for the Whole Country?, 69 AN-
TTRUST L.J. 687, 687-88 (describing and criticizing the expansion of the Federal Circuit's reach);
Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual
Property, 68 ANTrrrRusr L.J. 913, 919 (2000 (article by former Chairman of the Federal Trade Com-
mission expressing concern that recent Federal Circuit cases have upset the traditional balance be-
tween antitrust and intellectual property with disturbing implications for the future of antitrust in
technology industries); Boyle et al., supra note 15, at 739 (noting that the Federal Circuit has taken on
a "new and controversial role").
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to conform the new Circuit doctrine to the intervening precedents. The
result is a confusing tangle that distorts both antitrust and misuse doc-
trine.
III. SHOULD PATENT MISUSE REQUIRE A
VIOLATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS?
The confusion in the Federal Circuit's doctrine could be greatly
clarified by simply giving courts a mandate to require an antitrust viola-
tion in testing for patent misuse. This would defy both legislative and ju-
dicial precedent-not just the retreat in Senza-Gel and the rejected
senate proposal, but also the early doctrinal and theoretical history of
patent misuse. The question remains, however, whether the precedents
are wrong and the courts should be given a clear mandate to apply an an-
titrust test in all circumstances. As described above, a number of re-
spected scholars and legislators have advocated this approach,
particularly during the debate surrounding the 1988 Amendments to the
Patent Act.'45
In order for antitrust rules to provide a sufficient test for patent mis-
use, however, antitrust law must be focused on the same types of harm as
patent misuse, and the antitrust rules must be capable of intercepting the
same types of behavior that would create concern under patent policy. 146
Antitrust tests, however, are aimed only at identifying particular types of
harm. They cannot address the full range of patent policy concerns.
The primary purpose of the patent system is to promote invention.
This policy goal is embedded in the original Constitutional language,
which provides for legislation "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.' 47 Thus,
the Constitution does not simply authorize the power to grant patents, it
authorizes that power for the specific purpose of promoting the progress
of science.
The Supreme Court has emphasized patent law's primary goal of
promoting the public interest through the advancement of science. In
1945, for example, the Court noted the following: "The primary purpose
145. See supra text accompanying notes ioo-oi (describing the history of the amendments and
summarizing the debates).
146. This article is not intended to examine the arguments presented during the debates. Rather,
the article focuses on a different issue and is intended to challenge an assumption implicit in any ar-
gument that antitrust rules can provide a sufficient test for patent misuse: that antitrust law is designed
to identify the same type of harm as patent misuse. For highlights of the arguments on both sides of
the debates leading up to the 1988 Amendments, see supra text accompanying notes ioo-oi and
sources cited supra note ioo.
147. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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of our patent system is not reward of the individual but the advancement
of the arts and sciences. Its inducement is directed to disclosure of ad-
vances in knowledge which will be beneficial to society; it is not a certifi-
cate of merit, but an incentive to disclosure.',', 8 Thus, a patent is offered
only as part of a system intended to improve social welfare by inducing
inventions whose creation and disclosure will benefit society.
As part of the essential trade-off of patent law, an inventor receives
patent rights that are limited in time and scope in exchange for fully dis-
closing the invention in a way that would teach one of ordinary skill in
the art how to practice the invention.' 0 When the time of the patent has
expired, the invention should be dedicated to the public domain.'5'
Although in American legal history, the notion of granting limited
patent rights to induce invention can be traced back to the Madi-
son/Jefferson debates and beyond,5 ' modem economic theory explains
the need for patent rights and for limits on those rights. According to
modern economic theory, the intangible information embodied in any
invention has characteristics of a public good.'53 In other words, the in-
148. See Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1945). In a similar
vein, the Supreme Court noted the following in a landmark copyright case: "The copyright law, like
the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration .... The economic philoso-
phy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that it is
the best way to advance public welfare ... " Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (954).
149. See Bonito Boats, Inc., v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 541, i5i (1989) ("The ultimate
goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public domain through dis-
closure.").
150. 35 U.S.C. § I 12 (2003) ("The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out
his invention.").
i51. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. is1, 120 (0938) (citing Singer Mfg. Co. v.
June Mfg. Co. for the proposition that on the expiration of a patent the monopoly granted by it ceases
to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent becomes public property. It is
upon this condition that the patent is granted).
152. For a history of the development of the American Constitutional language, see Tyler Ochoa
& Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause, 49 J. CoPYRIGHT Soc.
675, 685-95 (2oo2).
153. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989) (landmark article identifying "[a] distinguishing characteristic of intellec-
tual property as its 'public good' aspect"); Paul Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36
REV. EcoN. STAT. 387, 387 (using the term "collective consumption goods" rather than "public con-
sumption goods"); see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme
Court: A Quiet Revolution, I I Sup. Cr. EcoN. REV. I (2003) (explaining that the intangible information
component of an invention is characterized by nonrivalrous consumption such that one person's con-
sumption does not reduce another's).
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formation can be used by many people without being depleted, and it can
be difficult to collect full payment from everyone who uses it.'54
A classic example of a public good is a lighthouse. With a lighthouse,
many can use the light without depleting it. In addition, given the diffi-
culty of allowing only some passing ships to use the benefit of the light,
one cannot easily enforce a rule that only those who have paid for the
light may use it.' 5
In the context of the intangible information embodied in an inven-
tion, the public goods problem manifests itself in the following manner.
Although developing information may require considerable investment,
once developed, information can be easily copied by others and inven-
tors may be unable to fully recoup their investments. 6 As a result, mar-
ket mechanisms provide inadequate incentives to invest in invention.'57
Given that society benefits from invention, we create patent rights be-
cause market mechanisms are insufficient to provide the maximum level.
The patent system itself, however, can create economic effects that
are detrimental to social welfare. For example, the patent system is in-
tended to encourage the creation of inventions so that society may use
them. Nevertheless, allowing patent holders to recoup their investments
by excluding potential competitors and charging higher prices ensures
that some users who would purchase the information only at lower prices
will be turned away empty handed. Thus, patent rights result in underuti-
lization of the information that the system creates incentive to produce."8
The problem of increased prices and the resultant underutilization of
the resources is a concern that patent and antitrust share.' 9 It is not,
however, the only negative economic effect of the patent system. For ex-
ample, consider the circumstance in which patent owners choose not to
license or market their inventions at all or have no success in marketing
them. Under those circumstances, the patent grant has no classic price
effect on a market because the patent holder is not extracting anything
154. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare & the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE Acnvrrv: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 6O9. 614-i6 (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research ed., 1962).
155. See, e.g., R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 187-214 (1988) (describing the
classic lighthouse example and disputing the implication that public funding is necessary).
156. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 153.
157. See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 444 (ex-
plaining that if pure and perfect competition prevailed incentives for invention and invention would be
fatally defective without a patent system or some equivalent).
158. See Arrow, supra note 154, at 617 (noting that in a free enterprise economy, patent rights
produce underutilization of information precisely to the extent that they succeed in supporting the
creation of that information).
159. See infra text accompanying note 171 (noting antitrust doctrine's focus on preventing behav-
ior that can raise prices and restrict output).
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from any market. Nevertheless, the existence of the patent may still
cause economic harm by increasing the costs of administering the sys-
tem' 6° and the search costs for those who wish to avoid the possibility of
infringement.
More importantly, patents encourage activity that is economically
wasteful or duplicative. For example, the patent system encourages du-
plicative activity as parties try to invent around patents held by others
rather than simply building on that work.16' This duplicative activity will
occur regardless of whether the patent holder chooses to exercise its pat-
ent rights in any way. As one scholar has noted, "[l]ive patents may ob-
struct inventive or innovative activity long after their owners have
decided not to use the inventions covered.",,6,
In addition, the patent system encourages defensive research activ-
ity, in which a patent holder tries to anticipate all possible alternative so-
lutions to the problem solved by the patent, even inferior solutions. The
patent holder then tries to patent the alternatives to block competitors'
i6o. As a general matter, all costs of administering the patent system must be factored into any
calculation of the costs and benefits of patent rights.
161. See Machlup, supra note 13, at 50-51; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 38-39
(4th ed. 1992); PHILLIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTrrRusT ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEX-r, CASES 151
(5th ed. 1997) ("The [patent system] may induce 'wasteful' research. Rivals of the patentee may have
to invent around the patent. While useful discoveries sometimes result, inventing around does not al-
ways seek better technology and may only produce an equivalent or inferior alternative to overcome
the roadblock posed by the initial patent."); Kaplow, supra note 3, at 1869 (noting that because invent-
ing around does not contribute to welfare when combinations are permitted, the resources devoted to
the task are entirely wasted); Donald F. Turner, The Patent System and Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 450, 455 (1969) (noting that "the patent system often leads competitors of patent holders to
invest resources in duplicating research to find noninfringing ways of obtaining the same or nearly
same result," using resources that in many instances "could be put to better use in attacking problems
as yet unsolved").
Some commentators suggest that economic loss from duplicative activity must be balanced
against any gain from accidental discovery that may occur in the process of inventing around another's
patent. Machlup describes this theory but also queries whether it is "easier to find the important by
seeking the unimportant." See Machlup, supra note 13, at 52.
The problem of duplicative activity may be enhanced by other design elements of U.S. patent
law, such as combining a winner-takes-all system with a system that grants a reward only after the in-
vention has been sufficiently developed and reduced to practice. Given that parties know of the patent
system and have an incentive to race to the patent goal, granting the patent later in the process in-
creases the economic waste that occurs when the one who loses the race ends up with nothing to show
for the effort. Cf. Steve Calandrillo, An Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Rights, 9 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 301 (I998) (arguing that rewards earlier in the development process
would minimize the loss from duplicative efforts in the race to patent by reducing the wasted effort of
the loser); Machlup, supra note 13, at 51 (noting the economic waste when the entity that loses the
patent race is barred from using its own invention).
162. Machlup, supra note 13, at Io.
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efforts to invent around the patent.'63 Such defensive research produces
limited social benefit if the solution is no better than the original inven-
tion. 6,
Moreover, some scholars have questioned whether the rewards of-
fered by the patent system distort the deployment of talent and economic
activity towards research and, more specifically, toward research that is
likely to yield patentable results.' 6' Distorted allocations are unlikely to
reflect the most natural and efficient flow of resources.
In addition to the problems of waste and duplication, the patent sys-
tem may actually hinder invention, the very process it is intended to fos-
ter. The process of invention is often evolutionary, as one invention
builds on inventions that have gone before. Granting a patent, therefore,
may have the perverse effect of reducing the next generation of inven-
tions because it reduces incentives and creates stumbling blocks for those
who would participate in the hunt for the next stages.' This is particu-
larly a problem for inventions that form the foundation of an entirely
new area of science or technology. Granting broad rights to those who
contribute to the early stages of invention can hinder the development of
later stages. In addition, delaying the point at which inventions enter the
public domain reduces the benefits society may gain in terms of a foun-
dation for future innovation.'
163. Machlup notes the following:
Although devised to solve an important incentive problem, the patent system is a crude and
imperfect instrument .... The [patent] protection provided is often weak because there can
be many viable solutions to a technical problem, so other firms can "invent around" a given
patented solution.... To be sure, companies often seek to fence in their technological do-
main by patenting every conceivable variation on a product or process.
Machlup, supra note 13, at 50-51; see F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 624 (3d ed. i99o).
164. See Kaplow, supra note I, at 1869 (noting in the context of patent settlement that defensive
research produces "no social benefit if the new invention is no better than the first").
165. See Machlup, supra note 13, at 51-52; see also FRED WARSHOFSKY, THE PATENT WARS: THE
BATTLE TO OWN THE WORLD'S TECHNOLOGY 246 (1994) (bemoaning the large amounts of time and en-
ergy that talented R&D staff must diverted to the task of assisting patent attorneys in filling the "pat-
entability gap," rather than devising new products or new and more efficient processes for their
manufacture).
166. For a general explication of the economics of the problem, see Robert P. Merges & Richard
R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990); Suzanne
Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON.
PERSP. 29 (i99i). For applications of this concept to particular types of invention, see Peter S. Menell,
Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1329 (1987); Mark A. Lemley, The
Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (I997); cf. Peter S.
Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV.
1045 (i989).
167. This is in addition to the reduction of benefits to society from delaying the time at which the
public can use the invention already created without reward to the inventor.
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In short, although patents are designed to promote the public inter-
est through the advancement of science, the patent system creates nega-.
tive effects as well. These include the anticompetitive effects of increased
prices and reduced supply. They also include effects separate from anti-
competitive effects, such as encouraging wasteful and duplicative activi-
ties and creating disincentives to future inventors.
Limiting the time and scope of the patent grant serves to limit the
detrimental effects of the patent system. 68 Thus, any test to determine
whether a behavior improperly extends these limits must be designed to
reflect the concerns embodied in these limits. Antitrust rules are unlikely
to detect many of the types of concerns embodied in limiting the patent
grant.
Consider a streamlined version of the Windsurfing test, one that
would clearly test patent misuse by conventional antitrust principles.
Such a test might define patent misuse as broadening the physical or
temporal scope of the patent with effects that are, on balance, anticom-
petitive.' 69 This can be proven by applying the rule of reason, which looks
for market power, anticompetitive effects, and a balancing of such anti-
competitive effects against any pro-competitive effects. " '
In a rule of reason inquiry under antitrust principles, a firm must
have market power in order to create anticompetitive effects. Without
I68. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 43 (5th ed. 1998) (explaining that the
length of a patent is limited to minimize the duplicative activity that would otherwise result from the
patent system).
169. Note that I have shifted the emphasis in the Windsurfing language by changing the test from
"broaden[ing] the 'physical or temporal' scope.., with anticompetitive effect" to "broadening the
physical or temporal scope ... with effects that are, on balance, anticompetitive." Compare Windsurf-
ing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF Int'l, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, iooi (Fed. Cir. 1986), with text accompanying this note.
Under an antitrust test, one would not forbid any anticompetitive effects but only those that are on
balance anticompetitive when weighed against pro-competitive effects. See supra note 113. Thus, the
formulation above would conform more precisely to an antirust inquiry. In addition, although Wind-
surfing, Mallinckrodt, and the later Federal Circuit cases describe the overview of the test as if any
anticompetitive effects would suffice, more expansive descriptions later in these opinions suggest that
the courts actually are looking for anticompetitive effects on balance. See Windsurfing, 782 F.2d at
lOOi-O2 (assertion of trademark rights can have pro-competitive effects and thus would rarely form
the basis of patent misuse); see also Mallinckrodt, Inc., v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (anticompetitive effects do not automatically impeach the restriction but are reviewed under the
rule of reason); Virginia Panel Corp. v. Mac Panel Co., 133 F.3d 86o, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (if practice
extends rights and does so with anticompetitive effects, it must be tested under the rule of reason).
17o. The hypothetical test is intended to completely free the Federal Circuit and other courts from
the bounds of the prior case law precedents. Thus, the test would eliminate the need to designate prior
cases as per se precedents. Going forward, all cases would be tested according to the antitrust rule of
reason. Although the courts could in theory develop sufficient experience with a particular type of
behavior to designate that behavior as per se misuse, the designation would be based on the notion
that the behavior is so likely to meet the rule of reason test that it is unnecessary to engage in the full
inquiry. See supra text accompanying note 96 (describing the classic per se test in antitrust).
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market power, a firm cannot raise prices and restrict output, thereby
causing the type of anticompetitive effects that antitrust law cares
about."'
A patent holder theoretically has power over the market repre-
sented by those who might be interested in the patented invention. A
patent grant, however, is no guarantee that anyone will be interested in
the invention or that a patent holder will be successful in capturing that
interest. In fact, eighty percent to ninety percent of patents never create
any monetary return for the patent holder.7' More importantly, the pat-
ented invention may be only one of many approaches available. If suffi-
cient substitutes exist, the patent holder may hold little or no power in a
properly defined market. In short, although a patent, in theory, could
convey monopoly power, it does not necessarily convey market power
and in many cases, it will not.'73
171. 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & JOHN L. SALoW, ANTITRUST LAW 501, at 90
(2d ed. 2002) ("The substantial market power that concerns antitrust law arises when the defendant
(I) can profitably set prices well above its costs and (2) enjoys some protection against a rival's entry
or expansion that would erode such supracompetitive prices and profits."); LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN &
WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 2.1, at 21 (2000) ("Antitrust is concerned with the power
of market participants to distort the competitive process... [w]ithout power, a market participant can
do none of these things, but is, instead, itself subject to the discipline of competition .... [Market
power] is a prerequisite for finding an antitrust violation."). But see Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Ste-
ven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE
L.J. 209, 251 (1986) ("[A] firm need not enjoy or acquire traditional market power to gain the ability
to price above pre-exclusionary-rights competitive levels. The strategy requires only barriers to entry
and expansion in the output market to succeed.").
The ability to raise prices and restrict output is a difficult element to measure. Thus, courts use
market share as a proxy for market power. See 2A AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW, supra 1 423, at 82;
see also id. I 8Ol at 319 (noting that although one cannot be too categorical, market shares exceeding
75% are sufficient to show market power while market shares below 50% are insufficient).
172. Machlup, supra note 13, at 12; see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANI-
TRUST LAW § 8.3, at 219 (1985) ("Many patents confer absolutely no market power on their own-
ers .... The economic case for 'presuming' sufficient market power.., is very weak."); Nat'l Inst. on
Indus. & Intellectual Prop., The Value of Patents and Other Legally Protected Commercial Rights, 53
ANTITRUST L.J. 535, 547 (1985) ("Statistical studies suggest that the vast majority of all patents confer
very little monopoly power...."); William Montgomery, The Presumption of Economic Power for
Patented and Copyrighted Products in Tying Arrangements, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1140, 1156 (1985)
("More often than not, however, a patent or copyright provides little, if any, market power."); A.1.
Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc., 8o6 F.2d 673,676 (6th Cir. 1986) (court "reject[ed] any absolute
presumption of market power for copyright or patented product"); USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies
Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 511-12 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting that not all patents confer market power).
173. The fact that a patent does not necessarily convey market power is now commonly accepted
by scholars, although the case law is less clear. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2, 37 n.7 (1984) ("A common misconception has been that a patent... suffice[s] to demonstrate
market power .... [A] patent holder has no market power in any relevant sense if there are close sub-
stitutes for the patented product."); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, i0 n.8, (1958) ("Of
course it is common knowledge that a patent does not always confer market power over a particular
commodity. Often the patent is limited to a unique form or improvement of the product and the eco-
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Where no market power exists, antitrust would be unconcerned by
extensions of the time or scope of the patent. This would be understand-
able given that antitrust is only concerned with certain types of effects in
the marketplace.
As described above, however, we limit the time and scope of a pat-
ent, not just to limit anticompetitive effects the way those words are de-
fined under antitrust law but to limit other detrimental effects of the
patent system as well. Thus, patent policy does not limit its concerns to
firms with market power.
For example, consider a firm that has extended the time of its patent
grant by requiring that all licensees agree that after the patent has ex-
pired, they will continue in perpetuity to operate as if the patent remains
in force. The patent holder thereby extends its patent rights, at least in
relation to its current licensees, through private contract.
The antitrust rule of reason would not raise any objections unless the
firm had market power. Patent law, however, would not permit a perpet-
ual extension of patent rights through contract for any patent holder.'74 If
it did, we would be changing the patent rules to say that a patent lasts for
twenty years, but the twenty-year limit only applies fully to patent hold-
ers who have market power.'75
Thus, under a patent analysis, we may forbid an activity that extends
the length of a patent grant even if that extension does not create the
type of anticompetitive effects that antitrust law would recognize. Limit-
ing the inquiry to behavior that violates antitrust law ignores significant
issues for patent policy.
Shifting the focus of inquiry from applying antitrust rules to applying
patent principles may bring less certainty to patent misuse, at least in the
short run. In recent decades, antitrust law has developed into a larger
and more robust body of law. It will take some time for courts to develop
more fully the tests and elements that will be faithful to patent principles
to the greatest extent possible.
nomic power resulting from the patent privileges is slight.");. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc., 157
F.3d 1340, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that courts will not presume that the patent holder's "right to
exclude necessarily establishes market power in antitrust terms"); ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW,
THE 1995 FEDERAL ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: COMMEN-
TARY AND TEXT 17-18 [hereinafter FTC/DOJ GUIDELINES] (explaining that an important corollary to
the guidelines published jointly by the FTC and DOJ is that intellectual property rights are not pre-
sumed to confer market power although noting that the case law is unclear).
174. Even contracts limited to perpetual royalties would not be permitted under patent law. See
CHISUM, supra note 7, § 19.04 [3 ][d], at 19-492 (noting that a provision in a patent license for payment
of royalties on use after expiration of the patent is unenforceable).
175. Note that an extension of rights by contract is not the same as a full extension of the patent,
given that the extended rights only apply to those affected by the contract.
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IV. REACH-THROUGH ROYALTIES:
THE PROBLEM APPLIED IN A MODERN SETTING
The prior section explained that antitrust tests are not designed to
capture all of the behavior that raises concerns under patent policy. This
section describes Reach-Through Royalties as an example of the insuffi-
ciency of testing for patent misuse by applying antitrust rules.
Reach-Through Royalties are a licensing arrangement used in the
biotech industry to license what are known as "research tools." Research
tools are not products sold to consumers, but rather products used to de-
velop the medicines, treatments, and medical tests that later will be sold
to consumers.
Research tools comprise a broad category of materials. The National
Institutes of Health (NIH), in guidelines for grant recipients who use or
create research tools, define the term "research tool" to embrace the full
range of tools that scientists use in the laboratory, including cell lines,,
6
monoclonal antibodies,"' reagents,"' animal models,"' growth factors,' 8
176. Vertebrate cells in a culture environment generally die after a finite number of divisions. See
BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 16o (3 d ed. 1994). The limited life span
makes it difficult to study human tissue cells outside of the human body. Using genetic or other ma-
nipulations, however, scientists can create populations of cells that replicate indefinitely in a culture.
See BIOPHARM, THE BIOMPHARM GUIDE TO Bio TERMINOLOGY 16 (2oo2). These are known as cell lines,
a term generally defined as populations of plant or animal cells capable of dividing indefinitely in a
culture. See ALBERTS Er AL., supra, at G-5.
177. Antibodies are proteins produced in the blood. See MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESEARCH
IN FocUs: MONOCLONAL ANTIBODIES, http://www.mrc.ac.uk/pdf-mon-antibodies.pdf (last visited Oct.
13, 2003). They recognize and bind to foreign invaders, singling them out for elimination by the body's
immune defenses. Id. Monoclonal antibodies are populations of identical cells grown in a culture that
are developed to secrete a single antibody and are immortalized, that is, can replicate indefinitely. See
VOET ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF BIOCHEMISTRY 677 (2002). Monoclonal antibodies are used to identify
diseases, test for the presence of substances in body tissues and may someday function as therapeutic
agents. Id.
178. A reagent is a substance used to create a desired chemical transformation either by entering
into and being altered by the chemical reaction or by providing the necessary environment for the re-
action to occur. See MARY MAIER, INTRODUCTION TO CHEMICAL SCIENCE 369 (1978); JAMES B. HENDRICK-
SON ET AL., ORGANIC CHEMISTRY 342 (3 d ed. 1g7o).
179. An animal model is a living organism in which a spontaneous or induced pathological process
can be investigated that resembles a phenomenon in humans or other animals. See Joe R. Held, Ap-
propriate Animal Models, in THE ROLE OF ANIMALS IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 13, 13-15 (Jeri A. Sech-
zer ed., 1983).
18o. Growth factors are proteins that must be present in the environment surrounding the cell, for
example in the culture or animal body, for the growth and normal development of certain types of
cells. See NEIL A. CAMPBELL, BIOLOGY 915 (4th ed. 1996). Growth factors are involved in many cellular
processes including (1) inducing the synthesis of specific factors essential to the production of the en-
zymes of DNA synthesis and (2) promoting differentiation, that is, signaling progenitor cell types such
as stem cells to develop into specific cell types such as blood cells or nerve cells. See ALBERT L.
LEHNINGER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF BIOCHEMISTRY 472 (3d ed. 2oo0).
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combinatorial chemistry 8' and DNA libraries,'8' clones83 and cloning
tools (such as PCR), methods,' laboratory equipment, and machines.'
For example, with the knowledge that human genes can be sequenced,
spliced, and shuttled between organisms, we now recognize that humans
contain a large number of proteins that play a significant role in human
health and that may be subject to therapeutic manipulation. 8, In this pur-
suit, some companies have compiled large chemical "libraries" and de-
vices that can screen an extensive number of potential targets to look for
substances that inhibit or activate specific proteins in the human body. '81
Such research may be aimed at finding a chemical that will operate on a
particular protein or it may be aimed at screening a large number of hu-
man proteins hoping that one will be inhibited in a way that can be de-
veloped into a life sciences product of some kind.
When a company purchases the rights to use a research tool, neither
the company nor the patent holder knows whether the research will be
successful. Much life sciences research is unsuccessful. For example, of
I81. In combinatorial chemistry, researchers try to synthesize and assemble large groups of com-
pounds so that a particular substance can be exposed quickly to a wide range of compounds to search
for potential biological reactions. See Stu Borman, Reducing Time to Drug Discovery, 77 (to) CHEMI-
CAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Mar. 8, 1999, at 33; Stu Borman, Combinatorial Chemistry, CHEMICAL &
ENGINEERING NEWS, Apr. 6, 1998; see also Jeffrey Hanke, Genomics and New Technologies as Catalysts
for Change in the Drug Discovery Paradigm, J.L. MED. & ETHICS (2OOO) (describing state-of-the-art
approaches to computational chemistry). The process can be expensive and difficult to accomplish
with the desired speed and accuracy. See id. For a description of combinatorial chemistry efforts at a
variety of biotech companies, see Borman, Combinatorial Chemistry, supra; see also Edward N. Tri-
fonov, Earliest Pages of Bioinformatics, 16 (1) BIOINFORMATICS 5 (2000) (describing the early develop-
ment of the field).
182. To create a DNA library, the DNA of an organism is isolated and cleaved into thousands of
fragments which are then cloned. See VOET ET AL., supra note 177, at 67-68. The library thus consists of
a collection of cloned fragments representing all or most of the DNA of a living organism. See
LEHNINGER ET AL., supra note 180, at 1128-29.
183. Clones are descendants of a single cell, and cloning is the production of large numbers of
identical DNA molecules or cells from a single ancestral molecule or cell. See LEHNINGER ET AL., supra
note 18o, at 986-98.
184. Polymerase Chain Reaction, known as PCR, is a repetitive process that exponentially repro-
duces a specific segment of DNA. See id.; BIOPHARM, supra note 176, at 46.
185. Different aspects of cloning methods could include: (I) methods for cutting DNA at precise
locations; (2) methods for joining two DNA fragments; (3) methods for selection of a small molecule
of DNA capable of self-replication; (4) methods for moving the genetically altered DNA from the test
tube into a host cell that can provide the enzymatic machinery for DNA replication; and (5) methods
to select or identify the host cells that contain the genetically altered DNA. See LEHNINGER ET AL., SU-
pra note 180, at 985-93. In addition, the term "methods" in the NIH Guidelines could refer to methods
other than those related to cloning.
186. Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts on Obtaining
and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: Final Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090, 72,092 n.I
(Dec. 23, 1999) [hereinafter NIH Guidelines].
187. Hanke, supra note 181.
188. Id.
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the thousands of chemicals and targets screened, only a tiny fraction will
prove useful even for further investigation, to say nothing of leading to
an actual pharmaceutical product. Among those inquiries that succeed,
however, a rare few will lead to blockbuster drugs or products that pro-
duce billions of dollars in returns.' 89 In response to this environment,
some patent holders have charged royalties measured as a percentage of
the final product created through a process which included using the re-
search tool. "9 As described in Congressional testimony, such payments
provide revenues from any downstream commercial products to those
who own intellectual property that may now be of uncertain value or util-
ity.'9 '
For example, suppose John holds the patent on a cloning method. In
exchange for a license to use the cloning method, Mary agrees to pay a
percentage of sales from any medicine or other product she may eventu-
ally develop from what she discovers using the cloning method.
Reach-Through Royalties have been criticized for creating a royalty
stacking effect in which downstream research and production may be
prevented or hampered by the presence of too many rights holders.'92
This is particularly problematic if multiple Reach-Through Royalties are
added as the product moves through research, development, and produc-
tion. For example, Heller and Eisenberg argue that reach-through licens-
ing agreements give upstream patent holders a continuing presence at
the downstream bargaining table.'93 As owners stack overlapping and in-
189. For example, Lipitor, a cholesterol lowering drug developed by Pfizer, generated almost $8
billion in sales in 2002. The antidepressant drug, Zoloft, earned $2.7 billion while Viagra, the erectile
dysfunction drug, earned $1.7 billion during the same period. See Tanja Sturm, Pfizer Profits Rise on
Blockbuster Drugs, WORLD MARKETS CENTRE RESEARCH ANALYSIS, Jan. 23, 2003, LEXIS, News Li-
brary. One scholar compares research tools to mining tools during the Gold Rush era, a useful analogy
in light of the tantalizing promise of fantastic returns compared to the many miners who earned little
or nothing. See James Gregory Cullen, Panning for Biotechnology Gold: Reach-Through Royalty
Damage A wards for Infringing Uses of Patented Molecular Sieves, 39 J.L. & TECH. 553,553 (1999).
I9o . Some would classify Reach-Through Royalties as part of a broader category of agreements
including exclusive or nonexclusive licenses on future discoveries or options to purchase such licenses.
See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 28o SCIENCE 698 (1998); Paul F. Fehlner, Biotech Research Tools, NAT'L L.J., July
1O, 20oo, at 19.
191. See Testimony of Dr. Harold Varmus, President of Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center,
Hearing on Gene Patents and Other Genomic Inventions, House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts
& Intellectual Property (July 13, 2000), available at http:www.house.gov/judiciary/varmo7l3.htm.
192. See, e.g., Fehlner, supra note i9 o , at 139; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Technology Transfer and the
Genome Project: Problems with Patenting Research Tools, 5 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & EVNTL. 163, 172
(1994); Gene Patents and Other Genomic Inventions, supra note 191 (reach-through provisions result
in sub-optimal use and discourage the vigorous development of the discovery).
193. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 19o, at 698-99.
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consistent claims on downstream products, the result is an anticommons
effect in which the resource is underutilized.' 94
Royalty stacking is one of a number of problems plaguing a biotech
industry in which so many parties have partial ties or interests in so many
elements that it is difficult for researchers or product developers to oper-
ate. The result is not only underutilization of current intellectual prop-
erty, but also a diminution in the next generation of research tools and
products.'95 In response to these concerns, NIH guidelines strongly dis-
courage the use of Reach-Through Royalties.'
96
Arguments in favor of Reach-Through Royalties include that the ar-
rangement allows parties to receive research tools at reduced or nominal
up-front costs.7 From this perspective, Reach-Through Royalties may
facilitate the use and dissemination of scientific knowledge, allowing
cash-starved companies to purchase research tools and permitting inno-
vative outsourcing arrangements."
Similarly, one could argue that Reach-Through Royalties allow in-
ventors to coax customers into using their products by offering to share
the risk. In other words, John convinces Mary to buy his product by shar-
ing in the risk that Mary will fail.
Finally, one could argue that Reach-Through Royalties should be al-
lowed because they solve an uncertainty problem. The parties do not
know how much to value John's invention and thus leave the question of
valuation open to a later date. Once again, the arrangement facilitates
the transaction between the parties, thereby encouraging the use of the
invention.
194. Id. at 698-70; see also John H. Barton, Research-Tool Patents: Issues for Health in the Devel-
oping World, 80(2) BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 121 (2002) (describing ways in which purchasers have
tried to avoid Reach-Through Royalties, including moving research off-shore).
195. See generally Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 19o.
196. See NIH Guidelines supra note 186, at 72,093. Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of
NIH Research Grants and Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Re-
sources: Final Notice, NATIONAL INsTITUTES OF HEALTH (published at 64 C.R.R. 72090) (Dec. 23, 1999)
[hereinafter NIH Guidelines].
Reach-through royalty or product rights [lead to] unreasonable restraints on publication
and academic freedom, and improper valuation of tools impede the scientific process
whether imposed by a not-for-profit or for-profit provider of research tools. While these
Principles are directly applicable only to recipients of NIH funding, it is hoped that other
not-for-profit and for-profit organizations will adopt similar policies and refrain from seek-
ing unreasonable restrictions or conditions when sharing materials.
Id. at Principle #3.
197. See NIH Guidelines, supra note 186, at 72,091.
198. See id. (noting the reduction of up-front costs for purchasers); Steven Maebius, The University
Office of Technology Transfer: The Attorney's Perspective, 5 CASRIP STREAMLINING INT'L INTELL.
PROP. 90, 91 (1999) (describing reach-through royalties as the cost of out-sourcing R&D to the biotech
industry).
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The NIH has found this line of argument unpersuasive, however,
noting that although a Reach-Through Royalty may be attractive to the
parties, it has the effect of creating restricted access to subsequent tools
and adding to the general proliferation of ties and competing interests
that is the source of current access problems throughout the field.' 9 In
other words, while the arrangement eases an access problem for the par-
ties, it increases access problems for the system as a whole. The NIH,
therefore, rejects the notion that one should evaluate Reach-Through
Royalties solely from the perspective of the participants involved, con-
sidering instead the systemic effects of Reach-Through Royalties in the
context of the goals of the patent system."2°
The legal status of Reach-Through Royalties is unclear. There are
few judicial or administrative pronouncements available, and the ones
that exist are in conflict. As noted above, NIH guidelines discourage the
use of Reach-Through Royalties."' In contrast, a district court recently
ruled that a license provision with Reach-Through Royalties did not con-
stitute misuse. In recent Congressional hearings, one industry expert
noted the need for clarification on whether Reach-Through Royalties
create antitrust or patent misuse problems, arguing that clear approval or
disapproval would be better than the current uncertainty.20
3
Reach-Through Royalties should raise patent misuse concerns both
for extending the time of a patent and for expanding the scope of a pat-
ent.20 4 For example, Reach-Through Royalties may result in royalties
199. See NIH Guidelines, supra note 186, at 72,093.
2oo. Kaplow similarly stresses the importance of considering the impact on the system as a whole
rather than on the individual parties. For example, Kaplow criticizes the notion that one can evaluate a
particular practice by calculating whether an individual party is extracting more reward than contem-
plated by the patent system. He argues that the approach is wrong in that it focuses solely on change in
reward, to the exclusion of change in societal costs, and on the individual parties, rather than on the
system as a whole. Compare Kaplow, supra note i, at 1821 (criticizing the assumption that the only
factor relevant in assessing various patent practices is the amount of reward available to the individual
patent holder as opposed to recognizing the need to assess all of the variables necessary to compare
the change in overall social cost to overall social benefit), with USM Corp. v. SPS Tech. Inc., 694 F.2d
505, 511 (7th Cir. 1982) (framing the relevant question as whether the individual is extracting more
reward than contemplated by the patent system).
201. See NIH Guidelines, supra note 186, at 72,093.
202. See Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 467 (D. Del. 2002).
203. See Testimony of Dr. David Earp, Federal Trade Commission Hearings on Competition and
Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy, Feb 26, 2002, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/o2o226trans.pdf (held at the Haas School of Business) (tr. p. 269-73)
[hereinafter FTC Hearings].
204. Two other topics present variations on the Reach-Through Royalty theme. The first is the use
of Reach-Through payments, not as a contract between parties, but as a remedy imposed by a court
for infringement. See Cullem, supra note 189, at 562-63 (arguing in favor of Reach-Through Dam-
ages). The second is the use of so-called Reach-Through Claims in a patent application. For example,
an application for a method of screening to identify compounds with a certain biological activity, could
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paid long after the patent on the research tool has expired. Ordinarily,
when the patent term ends, royalties should end, and the invention
should be dedicated to the public domain. Thus, Reach-Through Royal-
ties, at first blush, appear to extend the time of the patent beyond the
time contemplated by patent law.
Given that the research tool may be used in early-stage research,
one could argue that although the royalty will be paid after the patent
expires, it is a payment for the use of the invention before the patent ex-
pires. This argument could suggest that the payment is analogous to an
extended payment contract: I use your product now, but I can pay for it
over an extended period of time. In fact, the recent district court decision
holding that a license containing a Reach-Through Royalty provision did
not constitute misuse rested on the notion that the license did not im-
properly extend the time of the grant because the invention would be
used during the term of the patent, although royalties would be paid and
determined later. 205
also contain product claims directed to the compounds identified using the assays and pharmaceutical
compositions containing such compounds. See Vicky Clark, Reach-Through Infringement: What Are
the Limits?, BIO-SCIENCE L. REV. (2002), at http://pharmalicensing.com/features/legal; see also Stephen
G. Kumin et al., Reach-Through Claims in the Age of Biotechnology, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 6o9 (2oo2);
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 249 F. Supp. 2d 216, 218 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (infringement
claim failed because patent merely described a general plan for creating pain relief medication and
was thus held to be invalid as an "attempt to preempt the future before it has arrived."); Although
Reach-Through Damage Awards and Reach-Through Claims may present issues similar to those
raised by Reach-Through Royalties, they also present other issues that are beyond the scope of this
article. See, e.g., Intra-Video Inc. v. Hughes Elecs. Corp, 51 USPQ 2d t383, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (ar-
guing that proposing a damage theory that includes royalties beyond the expiration of the patent does
not constitute misuse because a damage theory is not developed in the course of a business dealing
related to the patent).
205. See Bayer AG, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 472-73. The court did concede that neither party submitted
any evidence to prove that royalties would be collected only for use prior to the expiration of the pat-
ent. Id. at 472 n.5. The reality may be different in that parties may return to pre-clinical research,
which could include the use of research tools, when later research yields imperfect results.
One could avoid the time extension problem by structuring the license so that the Reach-
Through Royalties are paid only until the patent expires. Any misuse inquiry would then turn on pos-
sible extensions of the scope of the patent, rather than the time of the patent.
The Bayer court considered and rejected a charge of extending the scope of the patent. The court
followed the Brulotte line of cases and held that the arrangement must have been for the convenience
of the parties because the plaintiff presented no evidence that it had suggested other licensing ap-
proaches during negotiations. Id. at 470-71. Interestingly, the court engaged in no antitrust or rule of
reason analysis at all. Although it cited the modem cases from the Federal Circuit, the Bayer court
declined to engage in this type of analysis on the ground that it had found no improper extension of
the grant under the Brulotte-type inquiry: "Due to the court's finding that defendant's acts do not con-
stitute patent misuse, it will be unnecessary for the court to address the presence or absence of an anti-
competitive effect." Id. at 469 n.2. Thus, the Bayer court's approach would require a full two-step in-
quiry in which a court first engages in a Brulotte balancing analysis to determine whether the parties
acted beyond the time or scope of the patent based on the absence or presence of voluntariness, and
then engages in a rule of reason or per se analysis.
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Even if the use would occur during the patent period, however, ex-
tending the time for determining the value of the use is inconsistent with
the current design of the patent system. Extending the valuation time
violates the notion that patent holders have a limited time to capture a
return on their inventions.
A patent is not a guarantee that a patent holder will earn anything.
It is a time-limited opportunity to try to capture a return on an invention.
The market may not be ready, for example, to appreciate the invention
during the patent period. Nevertheless, one cannot ask the patent office
to extend the patent for a few years on the grounds that the invention
was ahead of its time and the market simply was not ready to appreciate
its value. The market's inability to recognize or calculate the value of an
invention is one of the hazards of having a limited patent term.
As described above, the patent system has strong policy reasons for
limiting the time of a patent grant. These include not only concerns re-
lated to anticompetitive effects but also concerns related to limiting
wasteful and duplicative activities and creating disincentives to future in-
ventors. Leaving open the time for determining and capturing the value
of an invention threatens the overall balances struck by the current pat-
ent system. In particular, it shifts the patent system's current allocation of
reward between those who participate in the early stage of inventions
and those who participate in later stages of invention.
As noted, the process of invention is often evolutionary with one in-
vention building on those that have gone before. While early stage inven-
tors make an initial leap forward, later stage inventors create further
developments. Thus, many inventions are the product of successive con-
tributions by multiple inventors.
The structure of the patent system limits the reward that may be
gained by early stage inventors in comparison to those who come later.2"
Such limits enhance the overall progress of science by ensuring that those
who create initial steps do not discourage those who would take the next
steps by aggregating too much of the total available reward to those at
the early stages.
By leaving open the time for calculating the value of a current use,
Reach-Through Royalties shift a greater portion of the total reward
206. Relevant structural elements include, for example, the rule limiting the time in which an in-
ventor may try to capture a return on the invention, rules requiring a specific use for an invention and
limiting the protection to that use, other rules relating to the scope of a patent, rules on blocking pat-
ents, and the reverse doctrine of equivalents. See Lemley, supra note i, at 991-93, 1000-13 (in the con-
text of improvements, describing how time, scope, and other aspects of the patent system strike a
balance between the rights of original developers and subsequent improvers). For discussions of the
economics of early stage and later stage invention, see also other sources cited supra at note 166.
December 2003]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
available for an invention to those who contribute to the early stages of
invention leaving less for those who contribute later. This discourages
later in'vention and disrupts the balances implicit in the current patent
system.
In addition, increasing the time for determining the reward to re-
search tool developers enhances the wasteful and duplicative activity of
defensive research. Defensive research occurs when a patent holder tries
to anticipate all possible alternative solutions to the problem solved by
the patent, even inferior solutions, and to obtain protection for those al-
ternate solutions.2°7
The greater the potential reward, the more a patent holder will be
willing to spend protecting that reward. Extending the period in which
valuation may come to fruition greatly increases the potential reward.
Thus, patent holders will rationally spend more on the duplicative activ-
ity of defensive research. 208
In light of these problems, Reach-Through Royalties raise serious
concerns regarding improper extension of the patent term. An antitrust
analysis, however, would not be sensitive enough to recognize these con-
cerns across the full range of firms that could be affected. Antitrust
would only be concerned in the case of a firm with market power."°
Many inventions licensed through Reach-through Royalties would not
command market power."'
The 1995 Federal Trade Commission/Department of Justice Guide-
lines on Licensing Intellectual Property discuss the evaluation of another
licensing practice, grant-backs." In a grant-back, the license holder
agrees to give the patent holder the right to use any improvements that
the licensee may make to the patented technology. The grant-back dis-
207. See sources cited supra notes 163-64.
208. Although the size of the reward alone is not the relevant criteria for determining patent mis-
use, the size of the reward is not irrelevant. See supra notes I, 200 (discussing Kaplow). For example,
increasing the reward matters when an increase produces other relevant systemic effects, such as in-
creasing duplicative activity. It may also matter for calculating the change in the overall systemic ef-
fect.
209. During FTC hearings, Dr. Earp described a particularly vexing problem for those who advise
biotech companies on issues that might require a determination of market power. Research tool li-
censes, such as those that would contain Reach-Through Royalties, generally are entered into at an
early stage of development. At that time, the company has no product and no market power. Even a
very conservative outside counsel might conclude that the license agreement presents no problem.
When the agreement is actually scrutinized years down the road, the product may be quite successful.
A market power analysis could yield considerably different results. See FTC Hearings, supra note 203,
at 271-72.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 171-73 (a patent does not necessarily convey market
power).
211. FTC/DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 173, at 63-64.
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cussion provides insight into the way in which antitrust principles would
be applied to Reach-Through Royalties.
The guidelines note that grant-backs should be tested under the rule
of reason, and that an important factor in the analysis will be whether the
patent holder has market power." ' In contrast, patent policy would not
limit concerns to firms with market power.
In addition to the time extension issues, Reach-Through Royalties
also raise concerns about expanding the scope of the patent. These con-
cerns can be highlighted using the following risk analysis: John, who
eventually receives the patent, begins by taking a chance. He invests time
and money in hopes that he will invent something and succeed in captur-
ing a return. The possibility of receiving a patent gives John a greater in-
centive to take that risk by improving the chances that he will be able to
make a return on the investment.
With a Reach-Through Royalty, John licenses his research tool to
Mary, and they share in the risk of whether Mary will hit the jackpot.
The problem is that the gamble is not based on whether John invents
anything. The gamble is based on whether Mary invents anything. In
other words, John is using his patent to get a return based on someone
else's invention.
To decide whether this is a problem, one would have to analyze the
type of harm and decide whether it is a harm that causes concern. From
an antitrust perspective, we might not care. You can get any price you
want for your patent, as long as you are not creating the types of market
effects that raise antitrust concerns-effects that, at the very least, re-
quire market power.
Patent policy, however, would be concerned because the price ex-
tracted implicates patent policies outside of those related to anticompeti-
tive effects in a particular market. For example, the heart of patent policy
is promoting the progress of science. Reach-Through Royalties create
system-wide effects that may hinder the overall progress of science.
As described above, Reach-Through Royalties create royalty stack-
ing effects that may result in underutilization of both Mary's product and
future generations of products. Royalty stacking results in the presence
of too many rights holders which inhibits the efficient exploitation of the
invention. The problem not only limits exploitation of the current inven-
tion, it also hinders development of the future products that might
emerge if full exploitation of the product occurred. For example, limiting
212. Id. at io7-o8.
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the use of a research tool limits the products that may be invented using
that research tool.
A behavior that retards the progress of science would be of concern
to patent policy. This would be true even if it is in the interests of both
parties to the transaction because patent policy is concerned with the sys-
tem-wide effects of the behavior on promoting the progress of science.
Current antitrust tests are not attuned to this type of problem. In a
typical antitrust analysis, we would view the potential problem in terms
of John extending the power that he has gained in his product market by
virtue of his patent into the market for Mary's products. We would worry
about the potential for John to dominate Mary's product market, behav-
ior that will harm competition in the market for Mary's product.
With a Reach-Through Royalty, however, the problem is different.
John is having an impact on the market for Mary's product, but it has
nothing to do with trying to dominate the market for Mary's product.
Royalty stacking is a different type of problem.
In a world of perfect information, one might ask why John would be
willing to risk the possibility of royalty stacking and underutilization. Af-
ter all, John wants Mary to be able to sell products, too. In the rough and
tumble world of bio-tech start-ups, however, the behavior may be ra-
tional. John may not be faced with a choice of (i) earning an assured re-
turn from Mary with a regular royalty versus (2) the possibility of earning
more return with a Reach-Through Royalty balanced against the risk of
limiting the return if the royalty creates underutilization of Mary's prod-
uct. Instead, John may be faced with the choice of (i) receiving virtually
no return from Mary, because Mary's start-up cannot afford to buy the
tool, verses (2) the possibility of getting a piece of an astronomical jack-
pot. Under those circumstances, John's choice is clear and rational, al-
though it may be detrimental to the patent system as a whole. Patent
misuse rules based on whether the agreement is voluntary"3 fail to rec-
ognize that an agreement may be in the interests of both parties and yet
be adverse to the interests of the patent system as a whole.
One could argue that Reach-Through Royalties are no different
from an arrangement in which a patent holder contributes patent rights
in exchange for an equity interest in the development company. With an
equity exchange, the patent holder has transformed the patent into a ve-
hicle that may bring variable rewards far out in the future.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 81-9i (discussing the suggestion in Radio 2 that the valid-
ity of certain scope extensions should turn on whether the licensee entered into the agreement volun-
tarily).
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An equity exchange, however, would not create the royalty stacking
problem of Reach-Through Royalties. One who would use the down-
stream product negotiates only with one entity, Mary's entity, which then
shares its gains or losses with its equity stakeholders. There is no anti-
commons problem.
In short, Reach-Through Royalties demonstrate the insufficiency of
an antitrust analysis for patent misuse. If we test for patent misuse by ap-
plying antitrust principles, Reach-Through Royalties ordinarily will not
generate a cognizable harm. If we test for patent misuse by applying pat-
ent principles, however, Reach-Through Royalties raise serious concerns
both in terms of extending the time of the patent as well as expanding the
scope of the patent. These concerns are based on economic effects be-
yond the type and level of anticompetitive effects that antitrust law is de-
signed to detect. If we limit our misuse inquiry to antitrust principles, we
will be blind to significant concerns under patent policy.
CONCLUSION
Problems at the intersection of patent misuse and antitrust cannot be
eased by requiring the application of antitrust rules to test for patent
misuse. Nevertheless, in the last decade, the Federal Circuit has reframed
the doctrine of patent misuse by taking this approach. The Federal Cir-
cuit's approach is inconsistent with legislative and judicial precedent and
threatens to distort both patent and antitrust law. More importantly, an
antitrust analysis is insufficient to capture the full range of policy con-
cerns embodied in patent law.
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